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Abstract
The information processing perspective o f cognition and emotion has been a fruitful area 
o f research inquiry in recent years. As a result o f this recent spate o f interest, emotional 
processing biases in anxiety have been consistently demonstrated, indicating that anxious 
individuals possess a processing priority for threatening information. This study is an 
attempt to further examine the processing biases which characterize anxious and 
nonanxious individuals. Pilot work was conducted to investigate the utility o f a novel 
approach, the affective categorization task, to examine the affective meaning o f lexical 
stimuli. Pilot research using the affective categorization task with socially anxious 
individuals suggested that socially anxious participants exhibited a tendency to evaluate 
subliminally presented threatening information more accurately than nonanxious 
participants. Nonanxious individuals were more accurate in detecting the affective 
content o f neutral and positive information. Furthermore, socially anxious participants 
took longer to make affective decisions to emotional information, regardless o f valence, 
than did nonanxious individuals. Based on that preliminary data, a second and more 
complete experiment was conducted to replicate and extend those findings with generally 
anxious individuals. A secondary aim o f the full study was to explore the relationship 
between affective categorizations and underlying associative network representations. 
Overall, results from the affective categorization task were quite similar to those obtained 
in pilot work. Anxious individuals evidenced an enhanced ability to correctly classify 
subliminally presented threatening information, whereas, nonanxious participants 
demonstrated an enhanced ability to correctly classify subliminally presented information
vi
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that was neutral or positive in affective tone. Signal detection analyses, however, 
indicated that these results were primarily due to a response bias, or tendency for anxious 
participants to categorize all subliminally presented information as threatening. Such a 
bias in responding was not observed in nonanxious participants. There were no 
differences in decision time to emotionally valent information between anxious and 
nonanxious individuals. Additionally, contrary to expectations, no group differences 
were found in network representations using the Pathfinder (Schvaneveldt, 1990) 
methodology. Implications will be discussed in terms o f information processing theories 
o f emotion and cognition.
vii
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Introduction
Psychologists and theorists have been interested in the field o f emotion since the 
inception o f psychology. Exploration into the nature o f the human emotional response 
has led to increased understanding o f this multifaceted phenomenon. Emotions can best 
be conceptualized as products o f biological, cognitive, and behavioral components. I do 
not wish to debate the relative importance o f each component process in the experience o f  
emotion, rather, I wish to simply acknowledge that the experience o f emotion is complex 
and multiply determined. The proposed research project will focus on emotion from a 
cognitive information processing perspective.
In recent years there has been an explosion o f research into the cognitive 
component o f emotion. Much o f that research has employed laboratory techniques 
borrowed from experimental psychology. Basic research on emotion conducted using 
empirical approaches in the laboratory has offered significant contributions to the 
conceptualization and treatment o f emotion and its disorders (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, 
& Mathews, 1997).
Research conducted from the information processing perspective on the nature o f 
cognition in anxiety has established basic differences between anxious and nonanxious 
individuals in the areas o f perception, attention, judgment, the prediction o f future events, 
and the estimation o f risk (see Williams, et al., 1997, for a review o f relevant findings). 
The current project is based primarily on prior research examining basic perception and 
the processes involved in the evaluation o f the affective content o f words. Therefore, it
1
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deals indirectly with such issues as perception and attention at both strategic and 
automatic levels o f processing. The second component o f the proposed project is 
concerned with the representation o f information in long-term memory. Predictions 
based on network theory (Bower, 1981; 1987) indicate that anxious and nonanxious 
individuals should have different structural knowledge representations for threatening and 
nonthreatening information. Network differences are frequently invoked to explain the 
existence o f cognitive biases, although to date no reported study has directly examined 
semantic network structures for threatening information in anxious and nonanxious 
individuals.
To summarize, a general aim o f the proposed research project is to augment the 
extant empirical literature on emotion by examining the manner in which anxious and 
nonanxious individuals process information that is threatening or nonthreatening in 
nature. I plan to make a unique and significant contribution to that ample body o f work 
by examining a slightly different cognitive process, the affective categorization o f 
emotional stimuli. I propose to investigate the manner in which anxious and nonanxious 
individuals make affective decisions under conditions o f both conscious and automatic 
processing. In addition, I intend to compare performance on the affective categorization 
task to underlying structural knowledge representations which are purported by some 
theorists (Beck, 1976; Bower, 1981) to be the basic architecture o f cognition. This is the 
first attempt in the anxiety literature to empirically link the theoretical predictions derived
2
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from network-based theories o f emotion to demonstrable differences in a particular 
component o f information processing.
3
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Review o f Empirical Literature 
Throughout the past several decades, information processing paradigms have been 
increasingly utilized to investigate the nature o f emotion. That work has yielded 
numerous important findings which have heavily influenced the conceptualization o f the 
human emotional response and disorders o f emotion, most notably anxiety and 
depression. As the literature on cognitive biases in anxiety and depression is rather 
extensive, the focus o f the current discussion will be limited to information processing in 
anxiety, as that is the domain relevant to the proposed study. In addition, an exhaustive 
description o f each research study conducted in all domains o f information processing 
(attention, interpretation/judgment, risk estimation, and memory) will not be presented. 
Rather, findings in pertinent areas will be briefly delineated to provide a general 
framework for the present discussion. Greater attention will be paid to those aspects o f 
the overall findings that bear on the tenets o f the proposed study. I will also choose to 
focus extensively on the several experimental methodologies (i.e., lexical and affective 
valence decision paradigms and subliminal processing) that are directly related to the 
proposed methodology. Relevant theoretical models underlying much o f the research on 
cognition and information processing that are pertinent to the proposed research project 
will also be described in considerable detail.
Attentional Bias
Clinically, it can be observed that anxious clients have a tendency to exhibit a 
heightened perception of, and vigilance for, threat and danger cues in the environment
4
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(Beck & Emery, 1985). Experimental evidence using a variety o f information processing 
paradigms (e.g., Stroop task, dichotic listening, visual dot-probe detection, lexical 
decision) has confirmed the existence o f such attentional biases for threat in anxious 
individuals (see Williams, et al., 1997, for a review). An attentional bias towards 
threatening cues has consistently been demonstrated when there is a competition for 
attention between threatening and nonthreatening stimuli (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 
1986; see Mathews & MacLeod, 1994, for a cogent review). Additionally, it has been 
reported that nonanxious individuals have a tendency to shift their attention away from 
threatening information towards positive information, also known as a “positivity bias in 
normals” (MacLeod, et al., 1986).
Lexical and Affective Decision Tasks
Empirical data regarding lexical decision tasks using emotional stimuli will be 
discussed, as basic information about word recognition is pertinent to a discussion o f how 
emotions influence visual perception and is related to more complicated psychological 
processes, such as similarity judgments and word categorization. According to 
Niedenthal, Halberstadt, and Setterlund (1997), low-level cognitive processes, like lexical 
decisions and word recognition, provide the input for later stages o f information 
processing and are important components to consider in an investigation o f the manner in 
which emotion may influence the perception o f lexical meaning.
Although methodological problems plagued early studies on the influence o f 
emotion on lexical decisions, later studies have demonstrated that individuals take
5
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slightly longer to make lexical decisions to unpleasant or threatening words compared to 
pleasant or neutral information (see Williams, et al., 1997, for a review). As those 
findings suggested that the affective qualities o f a stimulus could influence basic lexical 
analyses o f a word, researchers began to examine the interaction o f the mood state o f the 
individual and the affective properties o f a stimulus.
Balota and Chumbley (1984) and Chumbley and Balota (1984) have offered an 
explanation o f the findings that some semantic characteristics o f a word may influence 
lexical decision prior to full lexical access. They postulated a two-stage model in which 
the first stage involves a global analysis o f the meaningfulness and familiarity based on 
the orthographic characteristics o f a letter string. According to the model, letter strings 
with a high degree o f familiarity and/or meaningfulness should produce quick lexical 
decisions. Letter strings o f low familiarity or meaningfulness result in quick “nonword” 
decisions. On the basis o f their model, it can be inferred that the greater meaning a word 
has, the more likely it is that the meaning will be available before a lexical decision is 
made (Hill & Kemp-Wheeler, 1989). When meaning becomes available, the individual is 
able to make an evaluative decision (e.g., pleasantness-unpleasantness rating) about the 
word. According to Hill and Kemp-Wheeler, anxious individuals may have the meaning 
of threatening words available sooner than nonanxious individuals and should therefore 
make quicker decisions about the affective quality o f such words. Mathews (1990) has 
also described such a process and offered similar predictions. In addition, data from 
network models would predict facilitation o f lexical decisions when the content o f the
6
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presented information matched the mood o f the perceiver. Although early attempts by 
Mathews to demonstrate processing biases using the lexical decision methodology in 
anxious individuals met with little success, adaptations to the basic lexical decision task 
paradigm have been fruitful in investigating processing differences between anxious and 
nonanxious individuals.
Matthews, Pitcaithly, and Mann (1995) examined lexical decisions to positive, 
neutral, and negative words using a stimulus priming paradigm. Participants included 86 
undergraduate students who were selected based on measures o f neuroticism and mood 
state. Target words were either preceded by an associated prime or the uniformative term 
“blank”. The stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), or elapsed time between the prime and 
the target, was varied to reflect SOAs o f both short (240 ms) and long duration (1500 
ms). Short SOAs (<300 ms) index the automatic spread o f activation between the units 
for prime and target words. Long SOAs (>300 ms), reflecting expectancy priming, are 
typically thought to require controlled processing and demonstrate an individual’s 
voluntary attempt to generate associates o f the prime. Overall, the evidence for mood 
congruent priming differences in neurotic individuals was scant and, in fact, were only 
observed in individuals who had relatively extremely negative moods. Specifically, 
results indicated that at both priming durations, neurotic individuals showed enhanced 
priming (i.e., faster decision times) for neutral information compared with low neurotic 
individuals. When only those individuals in extreme moods were compared, results 
indicated that for individuals in extremely negative moods, negative words were more
7
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strongly primed at both SOAs. Additionally, in individuals endorsing extremely positive 
moods, there was also a trend toward enhanced priming o f positive words at short SOAs.
Hill and Kemp-Wheeler (1989) examined decision times for both lexical and 
affective decisions in a group o f high and low anxious undergraduate students. Stimuli 
employed in both the lexical and affective decision tasks were “pleasant” and 
“unpleasant” words. “Unpleasant” words were rated as, “ ...having connotations o f either 
physical threat or threat to self esteem” (p. 1145). In the lexical decision task, participants 
decided whether letter strings were words or nonwords, hi the affective decision task, 
individuals were required to indicate whether a letter string was a pleasant or unpleasant 
word. The dependent variable in both tasks was reaction time for a lexical or affective 
decision. Results indicated no differences in lexical decision time to threatening and 
nonthreatening words between high and low anxious individuals. In the affective 
decision task, no differences were detected between high and low anxious participants in 
decision time for threatening words; however, low anxious individuals evidenced 
significantly shorter decision times than high anxious individuals for affective decisions 
to pleasant words.
Failures to find enhanced detection for threat words in anxious individuals using 
standard lexical decision tasks have been reported by Mathews (1990) and MacLeod and 
Mathews (1991). Those failures, which have presented interpretive problems for lexical 
access and network models, have been conceptualized by Mathews and colleagues as 
indicating that processing biases are not universal and point to the need for innovative
8
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methodological paradigms. Mathews has stated that, “...we suppose that anxiety is 
associated primarily with an attentional bias that accords priority to threatening 
information. When the task involves only one stimulus, as in the lexical decision task, 
there are unlikely to be group differences, because in the absence o f competition, 
attentional priority becomes irrelevant” (p.463). As such, research by MacLeod and 
Mathews and Mogg, Mathews, Eysenck, and May (1991) demonstrated that when 
stimulus strings were presented simultaneously in pairs on the computer screen, anxious 
individuals displayed relative speeding o f lexical decisions for emotionally negative 
stimuli. Those findings suggest that elevated anxiety may be associated with a 
heightened tendency to prioritize the encoding o f emotionally negative information, rather 
than with an overall increase in the speed or efficiency with which such information is 
processed (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). According to Mathews (1988), “Thus, 
whenever there is competition for cognitive resources, anxiety is associated with the 
assignment o f a high priority to processing threat-related information” (p.281).
Therefore, it appears that attentional bias in anxiety can be demonstrated using lexical 
decision paradigms only under specific methodological considerations.
Green and McKenna (1996) implemented a semantic judgment paradigm to 
investigate the nature o f attentional bias in highly trait anxious individuals. Participants 
included high and low anxious undergraduate students. The semantic judgment task 
consisted o f a procedure in which participants were presented a series o f  sentences with a 
gap indicating a missing word. After a variable delay, a single word (positive, negative,
9
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or neutral) appeared below the sentence. Individuals in the experiment were required to 
decide whether if  the word was inserted into the gap in the sentence, it would constitute a 
semantically correct statement. Results indicated that highly trait anxious individuals 
made semantic judgments about affectively negative words faster than they did for neutral 
words. Participant groups did not differ in the speed with which they made semantic 
judgments for positive words.
Mathews and Milroy (1994) reported a study examining affective decisions in 
anxious individuals. According to those authors, although prior research using a single 
stimulus presentation o f the lexical decision task methodology has failed to produce 
speeding o f lexical decisions for mood congruent information, “Theoretical 
considerations, and some data, suggest that such mood-congruent speeding effects should 
be more apparent in affective decisions” (p.535). In a series o f studies, Mathews and 
Milroy investigated that hypothesis by examining valence decisions to negative (e.g., 
funeral, stupid) and positive (healthy, clever) words. In their first experiment, 10 
individuals who worried excessively and 10 nonanxious controls were used as 
participants. In the first part o f the experiment, participants judged 60 supraliminally 
presented emotional words as “good” or “bad” in meaning. Following that task, 
participants were presented the 60 words from the first part o f the experiment and 60 
“new” words subliminally (33 or SOms presentation + a random letter mask). Participants 
pronounced the words if  possible, guessed, or said “no” if  they were unable to guess. In 
the last part of the experiment, individuals made “good” or ‘bad” valence decisions to the
10
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“new” words presented in the second part o f the experiment. Results indicated that all 
participants were slower for “bad” decisions, however, there were no significant group 
effects. There were nonsignificant trends in the data indicating that control participants 
showed enhanced speeding for previously presented positive words, whereas, anxious 
individuals demonstrated a trend towards enhanced speeding for threatening words.
The second and third experiments were conducted to further investigate the 
generally null results o f the first experiment, although neither employed subliminal 
presentation durations. The second experiment using another group o f 10 anxious and 10 
nonanxious individuals was designed to investigate whether greater initial processing o f 
stimuli was necessary to facilitate subsequent valence decisions, h i that experiment, 
participants first made either word length decisions (“short” or “long) or affective valence 
decisions (“good” or “bad”) to a series o f affective words. In the test phase, participants 
were required to make either the same decision as during encoding, or a decision not 
made previously. Again, group differences failed to emerge. The third experiment was 
designed to require individuals to rely more on emotional meaning, rather than potentially 
overleamed rote information regarding valence, and employed a slightly different 
experimental task. Ten anxious and 10 nonanxious individuals participated in the 
experiment. Individuals read aloud a series o f words and were required to decide which 
o f two positive or negative words was more semantically related to the target word. For 
example, the positive associate and matched nonassociate for the target word “praise” 
were “deserved/delicious” and the negative pair was “false/famine”. Once again, no
11
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differences between anxious and nonanxious individuals were demonstrated. The authors 
interpreted their overall findings, which were contrary to predictions from both relevant 
theories and research data, as potentially reflecting different components o f cognitive 
processing. They stated, “Threatening stimuli may be selected (or rejected) at a relatively 
early and automatic stage o f processing, not necessarily involving the consciously 
controlled operations that are required to report an affective judgment “ (p.550).
However, A. Mathews asserts that, “ ...there should be congruent valence sensitivity 
differences prior to awareness if  we could find the right measure to detect them...” 
(personal communication, December 3, 1998).
Selective Attention or Pre-Attentive Bias?
Another issue relevant to the proposed study is the nature o f the processing biases 
found in anxious individuals. Do differences in cognitive processing reflect the operation 
o f conscious, voluntary strategies or alternatively, are more automatic, involuntary 
mechanisms at work? Although automatic processes are usually considered involuntary, 
effortless, and operating outside o f awareness, research has demonstrated that there are 
instances in which some but certainly not all o f these characteristics apply (Bargh, 1989). 
Researchers have only recently begun to attempt to disentangle these and other complex 
questions, although that work has produced some consistent general findings to date. 
Seminal work by Marcel (1983) has demonstrated that individuals process backwardly 
masked target stimuli for meaning, even though conscious perception o f the targets is 
precluded. Using subliminal emotional stimuli, numerous examples can be found o f
12
permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
emotional priming effects related to the affective quality o f the subliminal stimulus on 
subsequent responding (see McNally, 1995, for a cogent review). Presently, most 
researchers would agree that at least some o f the mechanisms involved in the processing 
o f emotional stimuli are automatic (Mathews, 1990). Various paradigms have been 
utilized to examine the influence o f information presented outside o f conscious 
awareness. Specific approaches have included dichotic listening tasks, briefly presented 
or degraded stimuli, and masking procedures.
Dichotic l istening Tasks
In dichotic listening tasks, individuals are instructed to attend to information 
presented auditorially in one channel, while sensitivity to information being presented in 
an unattended channel is measured. The data has consistently demonstrated that anxious 
individuals are prone to the effects o f threatening material, even when that information is 
not consciously detected. For example, Burgess, Jones, Robertson, Radcliffe, and 
Emerson (1981) presented agoraphobics, social phobics, and controls with two different 
prose passages, one to each ear, and had them shadow (repeat aloud) one passage while 
ignoring the other. Anxiety-disordered individuals, but not controls, detected more 
threatening targets than neutral targets in the unattended passage. Foa and McNally 
(1986) have demonstrated that individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder have an 
enhanced ability to detect words associated with dirt or contamination than controls, an 
effect that disappeared after successful treatment. Work by Mathews and MacLeod 
(1986) indicated that anxious individuals, but not control participants, were significantly
13
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slower on a reaction time task in trials in which unattended threatening words were 
presented.
Interference on secondary tasks or facilitation o f threat recognition in dichotic 
listening paradigms has typically been interpreted to represent the occurrence o f 
preattentive or nonstrategic processing. However, as Holender (1986) points out an 
interpretive difficulty with such a conclusion is that rapid voluntary shifts in attention 
between channels cannot be ruled out. As a result, subsequent efforts to exclude the 
influence o f strategic processing have relied on the presentation o f masked stimuli which 
participants cannot consciously report (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994).
Masked Stimuli
The use o f masked stimuli have been employed primarily in the subliminal 
emotional Stroop paradigm. The basic Stroop task is a measure o f attentional deployment 
in which individuals are required to name the color in which a word is printed while 
ignoring the color word itself. It has been consistently shown that individuals take longer 
to name the colors o f the words when the words are antagonistic color names (e.g., “blue” 
written in red ink). Modification o f the original Stroop paradigm, in which words 
differing in affective content are to be color named by individuals in various emotional 
states, has resulted in over half a century o f research indicating that the emotional state o f 
the perceiver interacts with the affective quality o f the word. That work has consistently 
demonstrated interference in color-naming for information that is relevant to the 
individual’s primary area o f concern (see Williams, et al., 1997, for a cogent review).
14
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Stimuli in the Stroop task can either be presented at durations sufficient to allow 
conscious processing or at subliminal durations to allow for automatic processing. In the 
subliminal version o f the Stroop task, subliminally presented words are often presented in 
combination with a pattern mask, which is a stimulus presented either before or after the 
target stimulus, designed to prevent conscious awareness. In both subliminal and 
supralim inal versions o f the emotional Stroop task, anxious individuals demonstrate 
consistent interference in color naming when the target is threatening in nature. 
Interference has been demonstrated with both clinical and nonclinical participants (see 
Logan & Goetsch, 1993, for a comprehensive review).
The relationship o f threatening subliminal stimuli and information processing in 
anxious individuals has also been examined using masked pictorial stimuli. Ohman and 
Soares (1994) using a forced-choice recognition, backward masking procedure 
demonstrated that snake- and spider-fearful individuals experienced physiological 
reactivity (elevated skin conductance response) to supraliminally and subliminally 
presented feared objects. Additionally, Ohman and Soares were able to demonstrate 
content specificity o f the fear response, in that snake phobics demonstrated fear to 
masked snake images, although not to other objects, and spider phobics exhibited fear to 
masked images o f spiders only. Content specificity has not been demonstrated in verbal 
forms o f subliminal Stroop tasks.
According to Mathews and MacLeod (1994), “It seems that the earliest 
(preattentive) analysis o f stimulus meaning may serve only to classify stimuli as related to
15
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threat or not. More fine-grained analysis may be required before a match can be made 
with current concern, leading to more specific interference effects” (pp.39-40). Mathews 
(1997) has suggested that, “ ...all valenced stimuli are evaluated non-consciously, and if 
the relevant decision mechanism is sufficiently activated, further resources will then be 
directed to analyse it more fully....the early automatic detection o f potential threat can 
eventually lead to more controlled processes being deployed, and appropriate action 
taken” (pp.55-56). Automatic detection o f threat is a primary feature o f anxiety disorders 
and anxious mood states. Several theoretical models have been developed which address 
this feature o f cognitive processing and shed light on the complex interplay o f elaborative 
and automatic processing mechanisms.
16
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Explanatory Models 
Several theoretical models, although most notably network models o f emotion, 
have spawned much o f the research to date investigating cognitive processing biases in 
emotional disorders. It has become apparent, as research findings have accrued over the 
past decade, that a network account o f emotion as initially proposed is insufficient to 
accommodate the emerging data. As a result, modifications to basic network theory and 
the emergence o f several alternative explanatory models have been offered to account for 
the research data described heretofore.
Bower’s Associative Network Theory 
A popular and oft-used framework to discuss the relationship between mood and 
cognition is Bower’s (1981; 1987) associative network model. The theory originally 
outlined by Gordon Bower in his seminal paper Mood and Memory published in 1981 and 
extended in Bower and Cohen (1982), Gilligan and Bower (1984), and Bower (1987), has 
generated a plethora o f research examining the basic tenets o f his proposal. The essence 
of Bower’s model is that human memory can be conceptualized as a large system o f 
interrelated nodes or units representing ideas among “concepts, themes, and memories o f 
events” (Bower, 1987). That interrelated structure is known as a semantic network and 
represents an individual’s knowledge and beliefs about concepts and events. The spread 
o f activation among related concepts is responsible for an analysis o f a concept’s meaning 
and priming o f related concepts. Associative networks were originally detailed several 
years earlier by Anderson and Bower (1973) and Collins and Lofhis (1975) to describe
17
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basic semantic concepts. Bower originally proposed the idea that emotions could also be 
represented as distinct nodes within the network. Although the exact mechanisms have 
not been specifically delineated, Bower asserts that emotion nodes have efferent 
connections to related processes, such as, facial expressions, body posture, the autonomic 
nervous system and viscera, to word labels for emotions, concepts describing emotions 
and response patterns, to themes which provoke emotions, and memories o f events 
associated with emotions.
In his original description o f a network theory o f emotion, Bower discusses how 
the model accounts for several influences o f emotion on cognition. Those effects fall into 
three general categories: 1) Mood-dependent retrieval, wherein memory retrieval is 
enhanced when mood at encoding matches mood at retrieval; 2) Mood-congruity which 
means when the affective significance o f stimuli matches the emotional state o f the 
perceiver, enhanced attention, improved perception, and more elaborate processing 
leading to enhanced memory will result; and 3) Emotional priming in which emotions 
serve a top-down processing function that influences thinking, judgment, predictive 
inferences, social impressions, and self-observation.
From Bower’s model, mood should influence the relative ability to retrieve 
emotionally valenced information from memory and how readily emotional stimuli are 
perceived. Mood congruent material should possess a correspondingly increased ability 
to recruit selective attention, hi addition, comprehension processes should be biased by
18
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emotional state with mood consistent interpretations favored when information presented 
is complex or ambiguous (MacLeod & Mathews, 1997).
Recently, researchers have attempted to construct empirically derived depictions 
o f associative network representations (see Schvaneveldt, 1990, for a review). That work 
has employed the use o f basic structural models to generate graphic depictions o f 
associative networks for semantic concepts. The concepts that comprise an associative 
network are termed “nodes” and links between nodes represent associations between 
related concepts. According to Schvaneveldt, “The resulting networks have several 
interesting properties and they have also proven to be useful in a variety o f applications” 
(p.ix). Schvaneveldt and colleagues have developed a computer program, Pathfinder, 
which generates network representations from psychological proximity data. That work 
has illustrated the utility o f such an approach in the prediction o f academic performance, 
the demonstration o f differences between novices and experts in relevant domains, 
mapping geographic and spatial locations, priming paradigms, and memory research. 
Recently, attempts have been made to employ the Pathfinder technique in the domain o f 
emotion and cognition. That work has yielded significant differences in the associative 
representation o f domain specific information between men and women (Geer, 1996; 
Rabalais & Geer, 1992), between heterosexual men and women and gay men and women 
(Manguno-Mire & Geer, 1998), in sub-clinical depression (Melton, 1995), and in patients 
diagnosed with multiple chemical sensitivity (Gomez & Schvaneveldt, in press).
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Much o f the empirical research stimulated by Bower’s thought provoking model 
has demonstrated significant limitations o f the theory. The model has difficulty 
accounting for the inconsistency o f mood-dependent and mood-congruent retrieval, 
although some o f the failures to replicate those effects could be considered a result o f 
methodological factors (Wells & Matthews, 1994). In addition, the model has 
encountered other problems. Network theory predicts that emotions should act similarly 
at all stages o f information processing (i.e., perception, encoding, retrieval, etc.) and does 
not postulate different processes resulting from the experience o f different mood states. 
However, it has been consistently demonstrated that attention is more easily captured by 
negative mood-congruent material in anxious than in depressed individuals, while the 
recall o f negative self-referent events is more prevalent in depression than in anxiety 
(Mathews, 1988).
Williams. Watts. MacLeod, and Mathews’ Model o f Attentional Bias 
As a result o f the inherent limitations o f Bower’s associative network theory, 
alternative explanatory models have been developed. Many o f those models account for 
the influence o f emotion on pre-attentive mechanisms and are therefore directly relevant 
to the proposed study. Perhaps one o f the most fully developed alternatives to a strict 
network interpretation is the model presented by Williams, Watts, MacLeod, and 
Mathews (1988). The uniqueness o f the model is that it distinguishes differing biases 
associated with trait and state mood and locate them at different stages within an 
information processing schematic o f attention and memory (Wells & Matthews, 1994). It
20
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views the effects o f anxiety as pre-attentive, serving to divert cognitive resources to 
threatening stimuli in anxious individuals, whereas nonanxious individuals preferentially 
allocate resources to nonthreatening stimuli.
The original version o f the Williams, et al. (1988) model conceptualized two 
distinct pre-attentive processing stages (Mathews & McKintosh, 1998). In the first stage, 
the threat value o f a stimulus event is evaluated by an affective decision mechanism 
(ADM). If  the threat value is assessed at high enough levels, a secondary resource 
allocation mechanism (RAM) is triggered. High levels o f trait anxiety lead to the 
allocation o f attentionai resources towards the stimulus and low trait anxiety levels lead 
to attention directed away from the threatening stimulus. Such a conceptual framework 
predicts that anxiety should serve to influence perception and attention, as opposed to 
elaborative processes like memory and conscious retrieval. The data on attentionai biases 
in anxiety, in combination with the dearth o f support for memory biases in anxiety, lend 
credence to that assumption. Another relevant tenet o f the model is that anxiety should 
affect pre-attentive and automatic selection o f threatening material, but not post-attentive, 
voluntary selection for threatening material. The data appear to be generally supportive 
o f such a proposal, however, the model must account for the failures to find such biases 
on measures o f simple encoding, such as perceptual thresholds, lexical decision, and 
speed o f word reading (Wells & Matthews, 1994).
In fact, Williams and colleagues (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996; 
Williams, et. al., 1997) have modified their original conception o f the affective decision
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mechanism (ADM) to include a connectionist or parallel distributed processing network 
having similar effects. This “network” is slightly different from Bower’s associative 
network model, however. The Williams, et al. network proposes that the activation o f 
units representing threatening stimuli are strengthened by an emotional “tag” which is a 
result o f biological preparedness or prior learning history. “Threat-tagged” units have an 
advantage over competing stimulus units within the network, and therefore automatically 
increase the chance that the resource allocation mechanism would be activated, leading to 
attentionai bias. In the absence o f competition, no particular advantage would be 
apparent, because a single threatening stimulus would effectively control the network’s 
output, regardless o f whether it carried a tag or not (Wells & Matthews, 1994). However, 
clarification is needed about what an emotional ’’tag” is, how it is acquired, and exactly 
how it leads to greater activation o f meaning units representing threatening information in 
anxious individuals.
Q hm an’s Model o f Fear and Anxiety 
Ohm an (1993) provides another relevant model o f anxiety and information 
processing mechanism s. That model draws on evolutionary perspectives more heavily 
than either o f the two models presented previously. Additionally, it is more directly tied 
to the biological substrate responsible for autonomic activation in anxious mood states 
than previous models. According to Ohman, fear and anxiety have evolved due to their 
functional status in protecting people from potentially life-threatening situations. Other 
types o f fears (e.g., social fears) that are less relevant to life and limb have developed as
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the result o f a dominance-submissiveness system which serves a primarily adaptive 
function in the promotion o f social order by means o f facilitating the establishment o f 
dominance hierarchies. Therefore, according to Ohman, fear and anxiety are rooted in 
defensive responses that have been tied to contexts involving survival threats, either 
directly or indirectly.
Ohman asserts that a perceptual system designed to effectively locate threat is an 
essential component o f the system. As such, it is likely to be biased in the direction o f a 
low threshold for discovering threat, since false negatives (failing to detect actual threat) 
are more evolutionarily costly than false positives (detecting threat in the absence o f 
actual threat). In addition, Ohman suggests that the discovery o f threat should rely on 
early, parallel processing perceptual mechanisms, which define threat on the basis o f 
relatively simple stimulus features.
Specifically, Ohman’s model is concerned with several information processing 
mechanisms operating at distinctly different stages in the overall process. Incoming 
stimulus information is first analyzed by feature detectors, which provide a preliminary 
analysis o f the stimulus before the information is relayed to the significance evaluation 
system. It is assumed that the feature detectors operate primarily on the physical 
attributes o f a stimulus. At this initial stage, there is no interaction with long-term 
memory and therefore no meaning is assigned to the stimulus. Consequently, in anxious 
individuals, the cognitive system may be set to discover potential threat in the 
environment and select certain stimuli for preferential treatment in later stages o f
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processing. Alternatively, highly threatening or biologically prepared stimuli may 
activate autonomic arousal systems directly, without the need for further elaborative 
processing.
The feature detectors send relevant stimuli on to the significance evaluator which 
automatically assesses stimuli for relevance, sending relevant information on to a 
“conscious perception system”. The conscious perception system allows a slower 
conscious appraisal o f meaning via interaction with emotional memories stored in an 
“expectancy system”. According to Ohman, the locus o f the threat bias is found at the 
level o f the significance evaluator, however, the expectancy system clearly influences the 
activation o f the significance evaluator. “Thus, as part o f interrelated memory systems, 
memorial representations o f moods (Bower, 1981) or emotional responses (Lang, 1984) 
may prime memory areas focused on threat; as a result, the expectancy system sets the 
significance evaluator to respond to threat words, for example” (p.528). The conscious 
perception system is also activated by the initial registration o f threat and may result in 
competition with other tasks, thus accounting for the data on competition o f resources in 
attentionai tasks. The expectancy system is highly dependent on the organization o f 
emotion and memory and is conceptualized as an interrelated associative network 
structure which can serve to bias the significance evaluator at a nonconscious level.
The present research is not an attempt to directly test specific features o f any one 
model in particular. However, the previously described models were presented to provide 
a theoretical framework for the present study and to assist in the generation o f testable
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hypotheses. All o f the models share some reliance on an associative structure o f semantic 
memory and discuss autom atic and strategic processing o f information and therefore bear 
directly on the current methodology.
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Overview o f Experiment 
The current study aims to extend the research findings in the area o f threat-related 
biases in information processing in anxious individuals. Prior work has indicated, 
through both theoretical hypotheses and empirical data, that anxious and nonanxious 
individuals differentially process information o f a threatening nature. That work has 
moved beyond a general description o f the pattern o f emotional biases observed and 
moved toward a delineation o f the specific mechanisms responsible for individual 
differences in emotional responding. This study attempts to examine in detail one aspect 
o f information processing, the evaluation o f information as threatening or nonthreatening. 
I believe the current method is related to basic findings in both lexical and affective 
decision paradigms. To date, those data have been somewhat inconclusive and further 
work is needed to clarify the current state o f affairs. In addition, I would argue that the 
affective categorization task taps more elaborative processes than simple word/nonword 
judgments or positive/negative evaluations. By looking at the performance o f individuals 
on this task under conditions o f both automatic and strategic processing, I hope to further 
explore the mechanisms responsible for the production o f threat-related biases in anxious 
individuals. By employing this novel paradigm, I hope to augment the extant literature 
and aid in the conceptualization and understanding o f how individuals comprehend 
information in their environment. An additional goal o f the current research is to relate 
the findings obtained in the affective categorization task to the theoretical framework on 
which such an approach is predicated. Associative representations o f long-term memory
26
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are often invoked in research o f this kind and this study is an attempt to empirically 
examine the utility o f such a model.
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Method
Participants
Participants were recruited through the Louisiana State University undergraduate 
psychology research pool sanctioned by the University Committee on Research Involving 
Human Subjects. The research project was approved by the Institutional Review Board 
through expedited review. No one refused to participate in the experiment and all 
students received extra course credit for participation. Fifty-three individuals 
participated in the experiment. However, since a primary goal o f this study was to assess 
individual differences in the ability to categorize subliminally presented stimuli, it was 
necessary to ensure that participants demonstrated subliminal perception. Twenty o f the 
original 53 participants met this criterion as measured by chance levels o f objective 
performance on the lexical decision awareness trials. Furthermore, in order to assess trait 
levels o f social anxiety, the Social Anxiety and Distress Scale (SAD; Watson & Friend, 
1969), a 28-item paper and pencil measure which evaluates anxiety in general social 
situations, was employed and is included in Appendix A. Individuals scoring above the 
80th percentile (SAD = 16-17) were classified as high anxious (n=2). Those scoring 
below the 20th percentile (SAD = 0-3) were classified as low anxious (n=7). Participants 
were predominantly Caucasian (79 %) women (55 %), with an average age o f 22 years, 
and 14.24 years o f education. To summarize, a total o f 53 participants completed the 
study. O f those 53 participants, 20 met objective awareness criteria indicating subliminal
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perception, and o f those 20 individuals, 9 were classified as high (n=2) and low anxious 
(n=7) by the SAD.
Apparatus and Stimuli
Stimuli display and data collection were conducted using MEL Professional 
Program software (version 2.0; Schneider, 1988) on 1 o f 4 IBM-compatible PCs equipped 
with a VGA-enhanced monitor. All PCs had standard refresh rates o f 14.3 ms. As 
recommended by Schneider, timing checks were conducted on each computer to ensure 
uniformity and precision o f subliminal displays.
The task in the pilot study involved categorization o f subliminally and 
supraliminally presented words. Stimuli were selected to represent nouns with 
threatening, neutral, and positive meanings. Words were further categorized as socially 
or nonsocially related in order to investigate how socially anxious individuals responded 
to self-relevant information. This resulted in a total o f three word categories with 40 
words in each category. Half o f the words in each category were related to social 
concerns and half were nonsocial. Please refer to Appendix B for a list o f stimuli and 
word categorization. Words included in the experiment were selected from the available 
research literature and supplemented by additional pilot work. Threatening and positive 
words were selected from research by MacLeod, et al. (1986) and Mathews and MacLeod 
(1985; 1986). Neutral social words were not readily available from the extant research 
literature and consequently were generated by raters blind to the purposes o f the present 
experiment. Appendix C contains the instructions for the social neutral word generation
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task. Nonsocial neutral words were categorized household items used in prior research 
(Geer & Manguno, 1994). A total o f222 words was generated through these methods.
In order to establish that the identified words accurately represented their 
respective word categories and to obtain ratings o f word frequency, three separate classes 
o f undergraduate psychology students at Louisiana State University served as blind raters. 
Please refer to Appendices D-F for the specific task instructions for the three rating tasks. 
Each class o f students performed one o f the following rating tasks: 1) Placing the words 
into social and nonsocial categories; 2) Rating the words on a seven-point Likert scale for 
word familiarity; 3) Rating the words on a seven-point Likert scale for emotionality. 
Table 1 contains the data regarding the three rating tasks. In order to be categorized as a 
social or nonsocial word, interrater agreement for each word had to be greater than or 
equal to 75%, although category agreement was generally much higher. Threatening 
words were defined as words characterized by a strong negative emotional valence rating 
(M = 2.12, SD = .34). Positive words were rated by participants as evoking strong 
positive emotion (M = 6.1, SD = .35). Neutral words were those which reflected the 
approximate midpoint o f the emotionality rating scale (M = 4.4, SD = .33), defined as 
“neither positive nor negative”.
Procedure
The purpose o f the pilot phase o f the current project was to determine whether a 
novel experimental paradigm, based upon earlier work by Mathews and Milroy (1994),
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Table 1
Word Categorization Rating Data
Rating Data
Social/Non-Social % Word Length Emotionality Familiarity
Word Type M SD M SD M SD M SD
Threat
Social 87.45 6.8 7.95 2.63 2.21 .32 5.75 .38
Non-Social 92.25 7.2 7.75 1.37 2.03 .35 5.61 .48
Neutral
Social 93.45 4.92 7.95 2.74 4.6 .38 6.25 .38
Non-Social 90.1 6.41 7.8 1.2 4.1 .27 5.81 .71
Positive
Social 92.2 5.59 7.85 2.08 5.9 .33 6.17 .43
Non-Social 84.92 8.26 7.45 2.44 5.86 .36 6.0 .71
Note. Emotionality ratings were made using a 1 (very strong negative) to 7 (very strong 
positive) scale. Familiarity ratings were made using a 1 (not at all familiar) to 7 
(extremely familiar) scale.
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would be a useful empirical framework to explore differences in affective decisions to 
emotionally relevant stimuli between anxious and nonanxious participants.
Participants were seated at an DBM computer terminal and read general 
instructions for the experimental task by a trained research assistant. These instructions 
are contained in Appendix G. Participants were informed that the primary task in the 
experiment was to classify words presented on the computer screen as either “dangerous” 
or “safe”. Dangerous words were defined as those that were threatening in  meaning, 
whereas, safe words were defined as those which were nonthreatening in meaning. 
Participants were also informed that the categorization task was subjective and that they 
should respond with the answer that “seems best”. Individuals began the experimental 
trials after reading additional instructions presented on the computer screen, indexed in 
Appendix H, and completing a series o f practice trials.
In each experimental trial, a fixation cross (+) was presented at the center o f the 
visual display for a duration o f 1000 ms. Following a blank screen lasting for 500 ms, a 
one-word stimulus in lowercase letters was presented in the same place as the fixation 
cross. In the experimental task, each word was presented on two occasions, once 
supraliminally (300 ms) and once subliminally (14 ms), in a novel random order 
generated for each subject by MEL Professional (Schneider, 1988). Immediately 
following the offset o f a subliminal stimulus, a mask consisting o f a series o f asterisks 
equivalent to the number o f letters in the stimulus word appeared in the same location 
(e.g., table/***"1*). Following the offset o f the stimulus word or the mask, a response
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query displaying the correct response keys appeared and remained on the screen until the 
participant responded, followed by a blank screen lasting 500 ms. An individual’s task 
was to press a key to signify a “danger” response if  they decided the word was threatening 
and to press a key to signify a “safe” response if  they decided the word was 
nonthreatening. Response keys were counterbalanced across participants, so that for half 
o f the participants the ‘z ’ key represented a “danger” response, while the V’ key 
represented a “safe” response, and for the other half o f participants the ‘z’ key represented 
a “safe” response and the 7 ’ key represented a “danger” response.
In order to familiarize participants with the affective categorization task, ten 
practice trials were presented prior to the experimental trials. The number o f practice 
trials was selected based on a review o f the literature examining studies using subliminal 
processing (Bradley, Mogg, Millar, & White, 1995; Mogg, Bradley, Williams, & 
Mathews, 1993; Mogg, Kentish, & Bradley, 1993) and from pilot testing. In previous 
work, 20 practice trials were utilized. Feedback elicited from participants indicated that 
the number o f practice trials should be decreased significantly, therefore ten practice trials 
were selected for use in the actual pilot study. Stimuli used in the practice trials were 
novel stimuli that were not duplicated in either the experimental trials or the awareness 
trials. The sequence o f events in the practice trials was identical to the experimental 
trials, except that participants received feedback on the accuracy o f their decisions. 
Feedback to participants consisted o f visual accuracy feedback denoting either a “Correct 
Response” or a “Wrong Response” which was displayed on the computer screen
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immediately after participants made a categorization decision. Following 10 practice 
trials, participants were instructed to inform the experimenter if  they were unsure of any 
aspect o f the experimental task. None o f the participants expressed a lack o f 
understanding o f the mechanics o f the affective categorization task. As the practice trials 
were designed only to familiarize individuals with the experimental task, practice data 
were not analyzed.
Each participant made a total o f240 responses in the affective categorization task. 
Stimuli were presented in a random order in two equivalent blocks o f 120 words. These 
experimental blocks were counterbalanced across participants. Individuals received a 
short break between experimental trials in order to reduce the possibility o f fatigue
effects.
Following completion o f the categorization task trials, an objective awareness 
check was presented. Awareness checks are standard in the subliminal literature and 
necessary to ensure that participants are not consciously aware o f subliminally presented 
information. Participants were required to make lexical decisions to 48 subliminally 
presented words and nonwords. The 24 word stimuli were selected from the 6 categories 
o f words presented in the affective categorization task and were equated on word length, 
emotionality, and familiarity. Nonword stimuli were 24 categorized animal words 
scrambled to render them unpronounceable and were equated with words on word length. 
As in the experimental task, subliminal stimuli were presented for 14 ms followed by a 
backward pattern mask consisting o f a series o f asterisks. In half o f the trials a word was
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presented and in half o f the trials a nonword was presented. Participants decided whether 
a word or nonword had been presented by pressing the appropriate key on the computer 
keyboard. For half o f the participants the ‘z’ key represented a word and the 7 ’ key 
represented a nonword. For the other half o f participants, the ‘z’ key represented a 
nonword response and the 7 ’ key represented a word response. As in the affective 
categorization task, individuals were presented 10 practice lexical decision trials with 
visual accuracy feedback (“Correct Response’7”Wrong Response”), followed by 48 
lexical decision trials. As in the categorization task trials, practice trials were not 
included in data analysis.
Immediately following completion o f the awareness trials, participants completed 
the SAD (Watson & Friend, 1969). All questions were answered and feedback on the 
experimental task was elicited from participants. Individuals were then appropriately 
debriefed as indicated in Appendix I, thanked for their participation, received extra course 
credit, and excused from the experiment.
Results
The purpose o f the pilot experiment was to determine the utility o f the affective 
categorization task methodology in examining the effects o f anxiety on information 
processing. As these data are exploratory in nature, analyses are limited to an 
examination o f relevant questions and trends in the data will be discussed. The 
limitations and cautions o f such an approach are noted. As such, these preliminary results
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need to be replicated in the full study in order that more confidence may be placed in the 
overall findings and the implications derived from them.
Awareness Check
Average correct performance for the lexical decision awareness trials across all S3 
participants was 67%. This value was significantly higher than would be expected by 
chance, t (52) =  8.81, p  = .001, and therefore reflected potential awareness o f subliminal 
stimuli. As the experimental predictions are predicated on the assumption o f processing 
without objective awareness, it is necessary to exclude those participants that actually 
demonstrated awareness o f subliminally presented stimuli. As a result, only those 
participants (n = 20) who demonstrated levels o f awareness that were not significantly 
different from chance were included in an analysis of the data, t (19) = 1.5, p  = .15 (M = 
.51, SD = .04).
Subliminal Effects
As the primary hypotheses o f the present experiment are based on the assumption 
that individuals evidence subliminal processing o f emotional stimuli, an analysis 
examining the ability o f individuals to correctly classify subliminal stimuli into 
appropriate categories was conducted. Consequently, this analysis used data from the 
chance criterion participants only (n=20). Recall that these participants were selected 
because they were no greater than chance in correctly classifying whether a subliminally 
presented stimulus was a word or a nonword. If  individuals were able to classify words 
into appropriate categories at better than chance levels o f performance, it is reasonable to
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conclude that participants were able to discern the affective valence o f the stimuli, even at 
presentation durations too brief to allow conscious processing o f the word; thereby, 
demonstrating subliminal perception o f the emotional content o f the stimulus. The 
primary dependent variable in this analysis was hit rate (HR) and represented the correct 
classification o f a word as dangerous (threatening) or safe (nonthreatening). Threatening 
social and nonsocial words were considered threatening based on their negative affective 
properties and a response o f “danger” to these words was considered a correct 
classification or hit. Neutral (social and nonsocial) and positive (social and nonsocial) 
words were considered nonthreatening based on the emotionality rating data and a “safe” 
response to these words was classified as a hit. The average HR for participants 
collapsed across all six word categories was 62% (SD = .16). This was significantly 
greater than would be expected at chance levels o f performance, t (19) = 3.27, j> = .004, 
indicating that participants were able to determine some o f the affective qualities o f the 
word in making their categorizations. These data demonstrate that it is possible for the 
affective properties o f a stimulus to be discerned, even at very brief presentation 
durations, and lend credence to the assumption that individuals in the pilot experiment 
demonstrated subliminal processing o f emotional stimuli.
Category Validation
An examination o f the correct classification or hit rate (HR) for supraliminally 
presented words using the 20 chance criterion participants was also conducted to provide 
an independent verification o f the classification o f the words used in the affective
37
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
categorization task. The average correct classification across word categories in the 
supraliminal condition was 90% (SD = .05), demonstrating that participants agreed with 
the operational definition o f lexical stimuli. Participants fairly uniformly evaluated the 
terms operationally defined as threatening to be “dangerous” and the terms operationally 
defined as nonthreatening to be “safe”. These results serve as a basic manipulation check 
and provide support for the construct validity o f the stimuli employed in the present 
experiment.
Response Bias
In order to investigate the effects o f social anxiety on the categorization o f 
emotional words, separate analyses were conducted on the affective categorization task 
data from the subset o f nine high and low socially anxious participants. Before moving to 
a discussion o f the main findings related to anxiety effects, it is necessary to examine the 
possibility that the results o f the present study may have been influenced by response 
bias. As it has been consistently demonstrated that anxious individuals have a general 
tendency to interpret threat in the environment (Williams, et al., 1997), particularly when 
faced with ambiguous cues (Constans, Penn, Omen, & Hope, 1999), such individuals may 
be predisposed to make a “danger” or “threat” response to subliminaOy presented stimuli, 
regardless o f the true meaning o f stimuli. Since response bias mechanisms could be 
proposed to account for any observed differences between anxious and nonanxious 
participants, exploratory attempts were made to examine such a phenomenon.
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In order to examine the response bias alternative, the proportion o f “danger” 
responses in the subliminal condition across all word categories was examined. If  
anxious individuals exhibit a general response bias for threat, they should evidence a 
higher proportion o f “danger” responses across ail subliminally presented words, 
regardless o f the affective properties o f the word. Alternatively, if  anxious individuals 
are reluctant to make a “danger” response, then they should evidence a lower overall 
proportion o f “danger” responses. To examine these competing alternatives, a 2 X 2 X 3 
Repeated Measures analysis using the GLM procedure in SPSS for Windows was 
conducted. The between-subjects variable was SAD Score (high vs. low) and within- 
subjects variables were Social/Nonsocial categorization and Word Type (threat, neutral, 
and positive). The dependent variable for this analysis was the proportion o f danger 
responses given by each participant. Results yielded a significant interaction between 
Anxiety Level and Social/Nonsocial categorization, F (1,7) = 5.73, jj = .048, although 
means analyses were not significantly different. The pattern o f results indicated that high 
socially anxious individuals made a higher proportion o f danger responses to both social 
(M = .52, SD = .22) and nonsocial words <M = .64, SD = .30) compared to low anxious 
individuals CM = .35, SD = .24; M = .31, SD = .21). As can be observed from an 
inspection o f group means, this effect was slightly enhanced in the nonsocial word 
category. In addition, it should be noted that this effect was qualified by a marginally 
significant triple-order interaction among Anxiety Level, Social/Nonsocial categorization, 
and Word Type, F (2,14) = 4.68, j> = .06. Univariate analyses conducted to follow up the
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significant overall interaction indicated that high anxious participants had a marginally 
significant tendency to evaluate threatening nonsocial words as dangerous compared to 
low anxious participants, F (1,8) = 4.82, j> = .064. Surprisingly, this effect was not found 
for threatening social words, F (1,8) = .23, p  = .645. As an inspection o f the proportion o f 
danger responses for each category provided in Table 2 indicates, it appears that socially 
anxious individuals made a slightly higher proportion o f threat responses to all subliminal 
stimuli compared to nonanxious participants. However, except for the nonsocial threat 
category, the tendency for anxious individuals to make a “danger” response could hardly 
be considered overwhelming. Although the predisposition for anxious individuals to 
make a threat response to subliminal stimuli is enhanced relative to nonanxious 
individuals, the absolute proportion o f danger responses is considerably less for neutral 
and positive information than it is for threatening information. Therefore, it does not 
appear that anxious individuals indiscriminately responded with a threat response to all 
subliminally presented information. A signal detection analysis, including an objective 
index o f response bias, appears necessary in order to accurately determine the 
mechanisms responsible for the apparent tendency o f anxious individuals to categorize all 
ambiguous stimuli as threatening.
Anxiety Effects
In order to investigate differences between high and low anxious participants, the 
primary aim o f the proposed study, the proportion o f correct classifications or hit rate 
(HR) was examined. A 2 X 2 X 2 X 3  Repeated Measures analysis o f variance
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Table 2
Mean Proportion o f Danger Responses in the Subliminal Presentation Condition
Social Dimension
Social Non-Social
Low Anxious High Anxious Low Anxious High Anxious
Word M  
Type
SD M SD M SD M SD
Threat .51 .31 .63 .04 .44 .28 .90* .07
Neutral .27 .23 .47 .25 .28 .25 .55 .57
Positive .26 .30 .47 .39 .21 .17 .47 .24
Note. * High anxious participants differ from low anxious participants at p  = .06. 
(ANOVA) using the GLM procedure of SPSS for Windows was performed and included 
one between-subjects variable, SAD Score (high vs. low), and three within-subjects 
variables, Presentation Duration (subliminal vs. supraliminal), Social Categorization 
(social vs. nonsocial), and Word Type (threat, neutral, and positive). There was a main 
effect o f Presentation Duration, F (1, 7) = 30.65, p  = .001, indicating a higher proportion 
of correct classifications in the supraliminal compared to the subliminal condition (M = 
.92, SD = .06; M = .64, SD = .14, respectively). This finding was not unexpected and
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simply indicates that participants were more accurate in classifying information presented 
at conscious levels o f awareness.
There was also a significant interaction between Anxiety Group and the 
Social/Nonsocial dimension, F (1,7) = 8.19, p = .024. Paired comparisons revealed no 
statistically significant differences between group means, however, the pattern o f means 
indicated that low socially anxious individuals evidenced a slightly higher hit rate for 
social words compared to high socially anxious individuals, (M = .80; SD = . 11; M = .74; 
SD = .07, respectively), whereas, high socially anxious individuals evidenced a slightly 
higher hit rate for nonsocial words compared to low socially anxious participants (M = 
.80, SD = . 10; M = .76, SD = .08, respectively). This was in contrast to the a priori 
assumption that socially anxious individuals would more accurately detect the threatening 
content o f socially relevant information.
A marginally significant interaction also emerged between Anxiety Level and 
Word Type, F (2,14) = 3.27, j> = .068. Paired comparison analyses, including 
Bonferroni’s corrections, revealed no significant differences between means. However, 
the pattern o f means, as evidenced in Figure 1, demonstrated that for words with a 
threatening content, high anxious individuals evidenced higher hit rates, whereas, for 
positive (nonthreatening) words, low anxious individuals evidenced higher hit rates. The 
proportion o f correct classifications by high and low anxious participants for neutral 
words was identical. This finding, although not statistically significant, could be taken to 
indicate that anxious individuals are more accurate in detecting threat-related content and
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that nonanxious individuals are more accurate in detecting information that is 
nonthreatening or positive.
Figure 1
Anxiety by Word Type Interaction
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Figure 1. Anxiety bv Word Type Interaction (Pilot Study)
A univariate ANOVA was also conducted to further examine the results o f the 
overall repeated measures analysis. Significant differences in HR between high and low 
anxious participants for supraliminally presented neutral social words, F (1, 7) = 10.29, p  
= .015 and for subliminally presented threatening nonsocial words, F (1, 7) = 4.82, p = 
.064 were found. An inspection of cell means indicated that high anxious participants 
made relatively fewer correct classifications of neutral social words than did participants 
low in social anxiety when information was displayed at presentation durations which 
allowed conscious processing o f information (M = .80, SD = .14; M = -96, SD = .04, 
respectively). Recall that a neutral word was classified as correct i f  it was categorized as 
“safe”. Socially anxious participants categorized a greater number o f socially neutral
43
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
words (e.g., conversation) as threatening. Neutral social words were purposely selected 
for their ambiguity and it is not surprising that socially anxious individuals may have 
viewed neutral socially relevant information as threatening. However, it should be noted 
that this finding was simply a relative difference and, in fact, socially anxious participants 
classified over 80% o f words in the neutral social category as nonthreatening. As an 
inspection o f  the cell means in the subliminal condition presented in Table 3 
demonstrates, participants in the low anxious group exhibited approximately chance 
levels of HR performance for subliminally presented nonsocial threatening information, 
whereas, participants in the high anxious group demonstrated significantly higher HRs for 
subliminally presented threatening nonsocial information. Interestingly, the expected 
difference between high and low socially anxious participants in the classification o f  
socially threatening information did not emerge statistically, although an inspection o f 
group means yielded a slight trend in that direction. Anxious individuals appear to have 
an enhanced ability to detect threatening content at a subliminal level (both compared to 
neutral and positive information and compared to low anxious participants). This 
enhanced threat detection does not seem to be specific to socially threatening words and 
could perhaps indicate a more general threat effect not evident in low anxious individuals. 
High anxious participants were at chance levels o f  HR accuracy when the classification o f 
neutral and positive information was evaluated. The opposite pattern emerged in low 
anxious participants. Low anxious individuals evidenced a higher proportion o f  correct 
responses when classifying neutral and positive information and demonstrated chance
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levels o f performance in making affective judgments o f threatening information. These 
data are consistent with findings o f  other researchers (Taylor & Brown, 1988) who have 
demonstrated a positive interpretation bias in nonpathological individuals.
Table 3
Mean Proportion o f Correct Classifications in the Subliminal Presentation Condition
Social Dimension
Social Non-Social
Low Anxious High Anxious Low Anxious High Anxious
Word M 
Type
SD M SD M SD M SD
Threat .51 .31 .63 .04 .44 .28 .90 .07
Neutral .73 .23 .53 .25 .72 .25 .45 .57
Positive .75 .30 .53 .39 .79 .17 .53 .24
Note. * High anxious participants differ from low anxious participants at p  = .06. 
Decision Time
Although an examination of decision time (DT) was not the primary aim o f the 
pilot study, it is germane to the overall experimental hypotheses and will be discussed 
briefly. A preliminary investigation of DTs was undertaken to determine whether the
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current methodology would yield group differences and therefore be a useful dependent 
variable to consider in the proposed study. A 2 (SAD Score) X 2 (Presentation Duration) 
X 2 (Social Categorization) X 3 (Word Type) Repeated Measures ANOVA using the 
GLM procedure of SPSS was employed, similar to the analyses discussed previously.
The dependent variable in this analysis was the time it took participants to make a 
danger/safe response on the computer keyboard. All response latencies were measured in 
milliseconds. Based on recommendations by Mathews and Milroy (1994), responses less 
than 100ms and greater than or equal to 3 standard deviations above the mean were 
considered response outliers and were excluded from data analysis. Results indicated no 
significant within-subjects effects o f Presentation Duration, F (1,7) = 3.64, p = .098 or 
Social/Nonsocial dimension, F (1,7) = 3.33, p = .111. There was a significant overall 
effect o f SAD score, F (1,7) = 15.08, p  = .006, indicating that high anxious individuals 
demonstrated longer overall decision times compared to low anxious participants (M = 
769, SD = 30; M = 515, SD = 88). However, this effect was qualified by a trend toward a 
three-way interaction among SAD Score, Presentation Duration, and Social/Nonsocial 
categorization, F (1,7) = 4.48, p  = .072. Figure 2 displays the average DT for each word 
category. Results indicated that socially anxious individuals, when compared to 
nonsocially anxious individuals, took longer to categorize supraliminally presented 
emotional words, both positive and negative. The same pattern was observed for words 
with both social and nonsocial dimensions. High and low anxious participants did not 
significantly differ in categorization time for neutral words. There were no significant
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differences observed for DT in the subliminal presentation condition. Therefore, 
preliminary evidence exists demonstrating that the emotional qualities o f a stimulus 
differentially affect the speed with which anxious and nonanxious individuals make 
strategic congruent categorizations.
Figure 2
Supraliminal Decision Time Data
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Figure 2. Supraliminal Decision Time Data
In summary, results from the pilot study indicate that the proposed affective 
categorization task methodology appears to be useful in examining differences between 
high and low anxious individuals in the evaluation o f threatening and nonthreatening 
information. I was able to demonstrate subliminal perception o f affectively salient lexical 
information. Data from the pilot study was largely consistent with prior research from an 
information processing perspective and indicated that anxious individuals were more 
accurate in categorizing subliminally presented threatening information as threatening, 
whereas nonanxious individuals demonstrated an enhanced ability to classify subliminally
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presented nonthreatening information as nonthreatening. Differences in categorization 
time were also noted between anxious and nonanxious participants. High anxious 
individuals took longer to categorize both positive and threatening supraliminally 
presented emotional words. These results merit further exploration in order to replicate 
and extend these findings, so that an understanding of the manner in which anxious 
individuals process emotional information may be augmented. Therefore, the preliminary 
results obtained from the pilot study appear to be a useful starting place and also point to 
several modifications that may improve the current methodology. These changes will be 
explicated in the method section o f the full experiment. Through an examination of the 
relationship between network meaning structure and affective categorization data, useful 
insight into the mechanisms proposed to underlie the basic processing o f emotional 
information may be revealed. Specific hypotheses to be investigated in the full study are:
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Hypotheses
1) Subliminal processing of the affective content o f words will be demonstrated.
2) Group differences should emerge between high and low anxious participants in 
the classification o f content specific information. High anxious individuals should 
demonstrate an increased ability to classify subliminally presented threatening 
information. Low anxious individuals should demonstrate an enhanced ability to classify 
subliminally presented positive information. Theoretically, no differences should be 
apparent in the classification of neutral information or nonwords, although pilot data 
suggests that low anxious participants may have an increased ability to classify 
subliminally presented neutral information.
3) Differences in sensitivity or response bias measures would be expected 
between anxious and nonanxious individuals for threatening information. If, as expected, 
an enhanced ability to detect threatening content by anxious individuals is found, 
differences in the ability to discriminate threat-related fiom nonthreat-related content 
would be evidenced by an enhanced sensitivity measure in anxious individuals. 
Alternatively, if  differential hit and false alarm rates are observed, it could be due to a 
general tendency for anxious individuals to make a threatening response to barely 
perceptible stimuli and would be reflected by a greater index o f response bias across all 
classes o f stimuli.
4) Reaction time differences would be expected, although two different 
predictions could be made. From a strictly theoretical perspective, speeding would be
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predicted for anxious individuals for threatening information. However, data 
demonstrating that finding is equivocal and in fact, pilot data suggests, that anxious 
individuals are slowed in their decisions to emotional information both for threatening 
and positive information.
5) Differences in network complexity should be apparent between high and low 
anxious individuals. High anxious participants should have more complex networks, 
with more links on threatening terms than low anxious subjects. In contrast, individuals 
low in anxiety should have more complex networks, with more links on positive terms 
than high anxious individuals.
6) With regard to the relationship between the affective categorization task data 
and network complexity, there are several predictions that could be made. Assuming that 
differences in network complexity are demonstrated, I would expect to find a positive 
relationship between hit rate and network complexity. Two alternative predictions could 
be made regarding decision time data and network complexity, however. Theoretical 
considerations would predict a negative relationship between decision time and network 
complexity. Alternatively, if  response bias mechanisms or attentional capture is 
responsible for slowed decision times to affectively salient stimuli, then a positive 
relationship could be observed between affective decision times and network complexity.
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Full Experiment 
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited in the identical manner as in the pilot study. They 
were students enrolled in undergraduate psychology courses at Louisiana State University 
who speak English as their primary language. A total o f 538 participants was screened 
for participation in the experiment using the Trait form o f the STAI (Spielberger, 1977), a 
frequently utilized index of general levels o f anxiety with excellent psychometric 
properties (Fisher & Corcoran, 1994). STAI scores ranged from 21 to 67 with an average 
score o f 39.5 (9.65). Two hundred sixteen students, 108 high anxious and 108 low 
anxious, were eligible for participation in the study, as their score on the STAI placed 
them in the top or bottom 20% of all participants. Attempts were made to contact by 
telephone 150 o f the possible 216 eligible participants to schedule the computer portion 
o f the experiment. O f the 133 students that were actually contacted, 5 were excluded 
because English was not their primary language and 16 declined to participate. 
Accordingly, a total o f 112 students were scheduled for the computer portion o f the 
experiment. One hundred participants actually completed the entire experimental 
protocol. Data was excluded from two participants due to missing or incomplete data. 
Therefore, the total sample consisted o f 98 individuals (50 low anxious and 48 high 
anxious). Table 4 contains the demographic characteristics o f the total sample. As an
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inspection of Table 4 reveals, there were no significant differences between groups on 
any demographic variable.
Table 4
Demographic Characteristics o f  the Total Sample
Low Anxious
Participant Group
High Anxious
STAI-Trait 26 (2.3) 55 (4.9)*
STAI-State 28 (7.6) 50 (10.3)*
Age 20(2) 20 (2.5)
Gender
Men 36% 29%
Women 64% 71%
Race
Caucasian 80% 92%
African-American 14% 2%
Other 6% 6%
Note. Chi-square and univariate analyses for demographic variables did not significantly 
differ between groups. * Low and high anxious participants significantly differed on 
average Trait, F (1,97) = 1424.53, j> < .001, and State score, F (1, 97) = 139.30, p < .001.
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Apparatus and Stimuli
Two computer tasks (Task A and Task B) were presented to all participants in a 
fixed order. Task A was presented first in order to limit potential awareness o f 
subliminal stimuli. Both o f  the computer tasks were presented on 1 o f  3 IBM PCs 
equipped with a VGA-enhanced monitor. Task A consisted o f  the affective 
categorization task employed in the pilot study with several slight modifications, whereas, 
Task B was a similarity judgment task, utilizing the computer program Pathfinder 
(Schvaneveldt, 1990).
Task A (Affective Categorization Task)
The affective categorization task employed in the full experiment is essentially 
identical to the task used in the pilot study. It was employed to investigate how generally 
anxious individuals make decisions about the semantic content o f emotionally valent 
information. The subject’s primary task was to categorize subliminally and 
supraliminally presented individual words as “dangerous” or “safe” by pressing 
designated response keys (“z” and “/”) on the computer keyboard.
Based on the pilot data collected, three modifications were applied to the current 
methodology. In prior work, the three word categories (threat, neutral, and positive) were 
subdivided into social and nonsocial dimensions. Analysis o f that data revealed few 
relevant group differences with respect to the social/nonsocial variable. Consequently, 
the social/nonsocial distinction was dropped from the complete experiment. The stimuli 
employed in the present study was selected from the original set o f words rated for the
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pilot experiment. Forty words from the threat, neutral, and positive word categories were 
chosen. All word categories were equated for word length, familiarity, and emotionality 
where feasible. In addition, twenty nonwords were included in order to further assess 
issues o f response bias. The nonword category consisted o f categorized clothing items 
(e.g., sweater) that were scrambled to render them grammatically incorrect and 
semantically meaningless (e.g., eawster). Nonwords were matched for word length with 
the three word categories. Please refer to Appendix J for the experimental stimuli that 
were presented in the affective categorization task. Additionally, the entire list o f  words 
was subdivided into two lists, List 1 and List 2, which were equated on relevant variables. 
This methodological change was included to address the enhanced lexical decision 
awareness observed in the pilot study and has been used by previous researchers (Bradley, 
et al., 1995; Mogg, et al., 1993a). Since in the pilot study, stimuli were presented in a 
random order on two occasions (once supraliminally and once subliminally), it is possible 
that participants demonstrated increased awareness due to stimulus priming. Therefore, 
in the foil experiment, half o f the participants were presented List 1 subliminally and List 
2 supraliminally. The other half o f participants were presented List 1 supraliminally and 
List 2 subliminally. Based on recommendations by Fox (1996), supraliminally and 
subliminally  presented words were presented in a random order.
Following a series o f 10 practice trials, participants made a total o f 140 affective 
categorizations. Subliminal presentations included 20 words from each o f the 3 word 
categories and 20 nonwords, for a total o f 80 subliminally presented stimuli.
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Supraliminal presentations included 20 words from each o f  the 3 word categories, for a 
total o f 60 word presentations. A lexical decision awareness check followed the affective 
categorization task and, unlike in the pilot study, employed a novel set o f stimuli selected 
from the word categories used in the affective categorization task. In half o f  the trials a 
word was presented and in half o f the trials a nonword was presented. A participant’s 
task was to press a response key to indicate a word or nonword decision. A series o f 10 
practice trials preceded the 48 subliminal awareness trials. Practice data were not 
analyzed.
Task B fPathfinder Task)
In order to examine high and low anxious individuals’ structural knowledge 
representation for threatening and nonthreatening information, the Pathfinder 
(Schvaneveldt, 1990) methodology was employed. Pathfinder is a computer program that 
is based on complex mathematical algorithms rooted in graph theory that generates 
associative networks based on estimates o f conceptual distance between concept pairs 
(Dearholt & Schvaneveldt, 1990). By using both the affective categorization task and the 
Pathfinder task, direct comparisons were possible between the categorizations that high 
and low anxious individuals made regarding threatening and nonthreatening information 
and the underlying knowledge structure o f domain-specific information.
In the Pathfinder task, participants were presented 153 word pairs on a computer 
screen. All stimuli and data collection was conducted through the use o f the Pathfinder 
computer program (Schvaneveldt, 1990) on an IBM PC. An individual’s task was to
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press a number on the computer keyboard reflecting a similarity rating for each o f the 
word pairs. A nine point Likert scale was used, with higher scores reflecting greater 
perceived similarity. The words employed in the Pathfinder task were a subset of the 
words presented in the affective categorization task. There were six words in each 
category (threat, neutral, and positive) for a total o f 18 words. Nonwords were not 
included, as they have no relevance for meaning concepts generated by Pathfinder. All 
word categories were equated on word length, familiarity, and emotionality where 
feasible. Appendix K contains the stimuli used in the Pathfinder task.
Procedure
Participants were screened using the STAI (Spielberger, 1977) in a large group 
format. Individuals who scored above the 80th percentile were classified as high anxious 
participants and those who scored below the 20th percentile were classified as low anxious 
participants. High and low anxious participants were contacted by a research assistant, 
who was blind to group assignment, in order to schedule the computer portion o f the 
experiment. Once participants arrived at the laboratory they read and filled out an 
informed consent form and provided limited demographic information (age, gender, and 
race). Participants read detailed instructions presented on the computer screen prior to 
beginning the experiment. All participants performed the affective categorization task 
first followed by the Pathfinder task. Following completion o f the computer tasks, 
individuals completed the State Form of the STAI (STAI-S). Following completion of
56
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the STAI-S, participants were appropriately debriefed, thanked for their participation, 
given extra course credit, and excused.
Results
Task A (Affective Categorization Task)
Awareness Check. All analyses were conducted using the statistical software 
package, SPSS for Windows. The awareness check comprised 48 subliminally presented 
lexical decision trials (LDT) which followed the affective categorization task trials. The 
LDT were included to evaluate whether participants demonstrated awareness o f 
subliminal stimuli. The average correct performance for the total sample was 54%. This 
value was significantly higher than would be expected by chance, t (98) = 4.53, p  < .001. 
As a result, additional analyses were conducted in order to identify a subset o f 
participants that did not evidence awareness of subliminal stimuli (i.e., LDT performance 
below chance levels). Seventy-three participants met this criterion (36 low anxious and 
37 high anxious). Average lexical decision awareness performance for this subset o f 
participants was 51% and did not significantly differ from chance, t  (72) = .76, p  = n.s.. 
Consequently, subsequent analyses included only this subset o f participants whose 
objective awareness o f  subliminal stimuli was at chance levels of performance. The 
participants did not differ from the total sample with regard to any demographic variable.
In order to examine whether the modifications to the methodology o f the full 
study (i.e., stimuli presented once subliminally and once supraliminally in the affective 
categorization task and a novel set o f stimuli employed in the LDT) resulted in a
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significant reduction in lexical decision awareness compared to the pilot study, an 
independent samples t-test was conducted employing the average lexical decision correct 
performance for the total sample o f  participants in each study. Overall lexical decision 
awareness was significantly reduced in the full study compared to the pilot study, t (149)
= 6.44, p  < .001 (M.= .54, SD = .10; M = -67, SD = .14, respectively).
Subliminal Awareness. As the tenets o f the current study bear on a demonstration 
of subliminal processing of affective stimuli, an examination o f  the ability o f individuals 
to correctly classify subliminally presented lexical stimuli was carried out. An average 
proportion o f the correct classification o f  threat, neutral, and positive words, the overall 
hit rate, was the dependent variable in this analysis. For the purposes o f this analysis, 
threat words were considered correctly classified if  a response o f ‘danger’ was given. 
Neutral and positive words were considered correctly classified if  a response o f ‘safe’ was 
given. Nonwords were not included, as there is no truly objective criterion by which to 
classify meaningless stimuli. A one-sample t-test was performed comparing the average 
correct classification for subliminally presented words against chance performance (test 
value = .50). Results collapsed across all 73 participants indicated that the average 
correct performance, 61% (.10), was significantly greater than chance, t (72) = 8.50, p  < 
.001. As such, it appears that individuals were able to discern some quality or 
characteristic o f these stimuli which allowed them to make affective categorizations o f 
very briefly presented information correctly, despite their inability to make word/nonword 
judgments at better than chance levels.
58
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Proportion o f  Correct Classifications. The dependent variable in this analysis was 
the proportion o f correct classifications o f words or the hit rate (HR) calculated for each 
participant. In this analysis, categorization o f a threatening word as “dangerous” and 
categorization of a neutral or positive word as “safe” were considered ‘hits’. A 2 (low vs. 
high anxious) X 2 (subliminal vs. supraliminal) X 3 (threat, neutral, positive word type) 
Repeated Measures ANOVA using the GLM procedure was performed. A main effect o f  
Presentation Duration was found, F (1, 71) = 687.82, j> < .001, indicating a higher 
proportion o f correct classifications in the supraliminal presentation condition compared 
to the subliminal condition (M = .92, SE = .01; M = .60, SE = .01, respectively). A main 
effect o f  Word Type, F (2, 142) = 9.93, j> < .001, was also noted. Paired comparisons, 
including Bonferroni’s corrections, demonstrated that positive words had the highest HR 
compared to threat and neutral words, which did not differ (M = .80, SD = .11; M = .74, 
SD = .11; M = .74, SD = .10, respectively). Both main effects must be interpreted in light 
o f two significant interactions. The second-order interaction o f Anxiety and Word Type, 
F (2, 142) = 7.72, g  = .001, is most informative, and the results of univariate analyses are 
depicted in Figure 3. Results demonstrate that when considering both presentation 
durations, high anxious participants have higher hit rates for threatening words, whereas, 
low anxious participants have higher hit rates for neutral and positive words. Univariate 
analyses conducted to examine the significant triple-order interaction among Anxiety, 
Duration, and Word Type, F (2,142) = 3.2, p = .04, are highlighted in Table 5. In the 
subliminal presentation condition, results follow the pattern previously described (i.e.,
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high anxious participants demonstrate higher HRs for threat words and low anxious 
participants demonstrate higher hit rates for neutral and positive lexical stimuli). A 
slightly different pattern was observed in the supraliminal presentation duration 
condition, however. When lexical stimuli are presented supraliminally, high and low 
anxious participants differ only slightly in the correct classification o f positive words. 
Table 5
Average Hit Rate Proportion for Word Type bv Presentation Duration and Anxiety Level
Presentation Duration
Subliminal Supraliminal
Low Anxious High Anxious Low Anxious High Anxious
Word M  SD M SD M SD M SD
Type
Threat 15 21 62* A l  ^88 AO 9^1 t f T
Neutral .66 .17 .55** .18 .87 .13 .89 .09
Positive .68 .17 .59*** .20 .99 .03 .96****.05
Note. Within presentation duration, high anxious and low anxious participants differ at:
*F (1, 72) = 3.72, b  = .058; **F (1, 72) = 7.59, e  = .007; ***F (1, 72) = 4.14, e  = .046;
****F (1, 72) = 6.44, £  = .013.
60
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Figure 3
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Figure 3. Anxiety bv Word Type Interaction (Full Study)
Proportion o f Stimuli Categorized as “Dangerous”. The present analysis was 
conducted to examine the overall proportion o f “danger” responses to lexical stimuli. An 
examination o f these data allows direct comparisons with the results o f the pilot study and 
underscores the need to examine these data using a signal detection analysis in order to 
confirm the initial impressions reached by an inspection o f these results. The dependent 
variable in these analyses was the average proportion o f “danger” responses to all stimuli 
calculated for each participant. The within-subjects independent variables were 
Presentation Duration (subliminal vs. supraliminal) and Word Type (threat, neutral, 
positive). Anxiety Level (low vs. high) was the only between-subjects independent 
variable. A 2 (low vs. high anxious) X 2 (subliminal vs. supraliminal) X 3 (threat, 
neutral, positive word type) Repeated Measures ANOVA using the GLM procedure was
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performed. A main effect o f Presentation Duration was found, F (1, 71) = 28.99, g  <
.001, indicating a greater proportion of danger responses in the subliminal presentation 
condition compared to the supraliminal condition (M = .45, SE = .02; M = .35, SE = .01, 
respectively). A main effect o f Word Type, F (2, 142) = 994.85, g < .001, was also noted. 
Paired t-tests, including Bonferroni’s corrections, demonstrated that collapsed across 
subliminal and supraliminal presentation durations, threatening words had the highest 
proportion o f danger responses compared to neutral and positive word categories, which 
also differed significantly from each other (M = -74, SD = .11; M = .26, SD = .10; M = 
.20, SD =11,  respectively). All paired comparisons were significant beyond the g = .001 
level. This analysis simply indicates that, as expected, all individuals categorized 
threatening words as dangerous significantly more often than all other words. Neutral 
words were also categorized as dangerous slightly more frequently than positive words, 
although the overall difference was relatively modest. A main effect o f Anxiety Level 
was also noted, F (1, 71) = 8.92, g  = .004, indicating that anxious individuals categorized 
all subliminally and supraliminally presented lexical information as dangerous more often 
than nonanxious individuals (M = .43, SE = .01; M = .37, SE = .01, respectively), similar 
to results obtained in the pilot study. This effect could potentially signify a  response bias 
toward danger in anxious individuals and will be examined in greater detail using signal 
detection parameters. All o f these main effects must be interpreted in light o f two 
significant interactions, however. An interaction was observed between Presentation 
Duration and Anxiety Level, F (1, 71) = 4.38, g  = .04. A 2 (low vs. high anxious) X 2
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(subliminal vs. supraliminal) ANOVA was conducted to follow up the results o f the 
significant interaction and indicated that anxious individuals made a significantly greater 
proportion of “danger” responses in the subliminal condition only, F (1, 72), = 7.40, j> = 
.008. Please refer to Table 6 for a depiction of group means by condition. There was also 
an interaction between Presentation Duration and Word Type, F (2, 142) = 468.48, p  < 
.001. The results o f paired comparisons, including Bonfenoni’s corrections, are 
contained in Table 7. The proportion of “danger” categorizations was greater for all 
subliminally presented categories o f lexical information compared to all categories o f 
supraliminally presented information, with the exception of the threat word category. 
Table 6
Mean Proportion o f Danger Responses to All Words bv Presentation Condition and 
Anxiety Level
Anxiety Level
Low High
Duration M SD M SD
Subliminal .40 .15 .50* .15
Supraliminal .34 .07 .35 .05
Note. *p = .008
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Mean Proportion o f Danger Responses bv Presentation Duration and Word Type
Subliminal
Presentation Duration
Supraliminal
Word Type M SD M SD
Threat (HR) .58 .19 .89* .09
Neutral (FAR) .40 .18 .12** .11
Positive (FAR) .37 .19 .03*** .04
Note. HR = Hit Rate; FAR = False Alarm Rate. Presentation Duration values differ at: *t 
(72) = -12.82, £  < .001; **t (72) = 10.99, £  < .001; ***t (72) = 16.80, £  < .001.
As anxious individuals differed primarily in the proportion o f danger responses to 
subliminal stimuli, an additional ANOVA was performed to examine whether this effect 
was consistent across all classes o f  stimuli. Categorization o f nonwords was included in 
this analysis, so that an examination o f a  tendency to classify all subliminally presented 
stimuli could be investigated. Refer to Table 8 for group means as a function o f  word 
category. A 2 (low vs. high anxious) X 4 (threat, neutral, positive, nonword) ANOVA 
was conducted and indicated that anxious individuals made a significantly higher 
proportion of “danger” categorizations to all lexical stimuli. The nonword condition was
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not statistically significant, although the trend remained similar. These data are 
consistent with pilot results and suggest that anxious participants could be demonstrating 
a response bias, or tendency to categorize subliminally  presented information as 
threatening. In order to further elucidate this hypothesis, a signal detection analysis o f 
these data was performed.
Table 8
Mean Proportion o f Danger Responses to All Subliminal Stimuli bv Anxiety Level
Low Anxious High Anxious
Word Type M SD M SD
Threat (HR) .53 .21 .62* .17
Neutral (FAR) .35 .17 .46** .18
Positive (FAR) .32 .17 .41*** .20
Nonword .45 .17 .49 .18
Note. HR = Hit Rate; FAR = False Alarm Rate. High and low anxious participants differ 
at: *F (1, 72) = 3.72, p  = .058; **F (1, 72) = 7.59, p  = .007; ***F (1, 72) = 4.14, p = .046; 
****F( 1, 72) = 6.44, p =  .013.
Signal Detection Analysis. Signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966) is a 
theory originally presented in the human factors literature to describe the ability of 
individuals to decipher a stimulus from extraneous background information. It has been
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applied recently in the anxiety and recognition memory literature with mixed results. 
Mogg, Mathews, and Weinman (1989) and Mathews and MacLeod (198S) failed to find 
recognition biases in anxious individuals using a signal detection analysis. However, 
recent work by Windmann and Kruger (1998) and Brown, Kosslyn, Breiter, Baer, and 
Jenike (1994) have demonstrated differences, albeit in both response bias and sensitivity 
measures, in panic patients and OCD patients, respectively.
A signal detection analysis was conducted to take into account the proportion o f 
“danger” responses in the categorization o f stimuli. In the lexicon o f signal detection 
theory, a “danger” response to a threat word is considered a ‘hit’ and a “danger” response 
to a neutral or positive word is considered a ‘false alarm’. The utility o f  signal detection 
theory is that it provides corrected measures o f hit and false alarm rates, considering the 
independent contribution o f each for a target class o f stimuli. The raw hit and false alarm 
rates are converted to standardized units which are then plugged into two general 
formulas provided by Macmillan and Creelman (1991). These formulas produce two 
independent measures o f the individual’s ability to recognize, or in the case o f the present 
experiment, categorize different classes o f stimuli. One o f the measures, sensitivity, or 
d’, is an index o f the ability to discriminate between two classes o f stimuli and is 
represented by the formula (d’ = z(H) - z(F)). Theoretically, d’, can range from 0 to 
infinity, although practically speaking d’ rarely exceeds a value o f 4.65. A d ’ =  4.65 
would indicate perfect discriminability in which hit rates are 100% and the false alarm 
rate is 0%. When sensitivity is high, the individual is very likely to detect the accurate
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meaning o f a stimulus (i.e., categorize threatening words as “dangerous” and 
nonthreatening words as “safe”) and less likely to make a mistake (i.e., categorize 
threatening words as “safe” and nonthreatening words as “dangerous”). Conversely, a d’ 
of 0 represents practically equivalent hit and false alarm rates in which individuals are 
unable to discriminate stimuli at all. Moderate performance would be reflected by d ’ = I .
Signal detection theory also computes a measure o f response bias, or c (criterion), 
which represents a criterion-based decision that an individual uses to recognize or classify 
stimuli. It can reflect the predisposition o f an individual to respond in a certain manner or 
tendency to favor one response over another. The measure, c, is produced by the general 
formula (c = -0.5 [z(H) + z(F)]). Theoretically, c is presumed to range from negative 
infinity to positive infinity, although in practice, c values typically range from -1 to +1. A 
criterion o f 0 reflects no bias on the part of the observer. Positive values reflect a 
conservative criterion in which hit and false alarm rates are minimized; whereas, negative 
values represent a liberal criterion in which hits and false alarms are maximized. It is 
particularly important in an evaluation of the data from the affective categorization task to 
rely on an approach that takes into account both hit and false alarm rates, so that the 
underlying mechanisms responsible for differences in those parameters can not only be 
described, but understood in greater detail.
A computer program for the generation o f parametric (d' and c) and 
nonparametric (A ’ and bnbd) signal detection measures using SPSS for Windows was 
provided by J. Hicks (personal communication, November 8, 1999), following the
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recommendations o f Macmillan and Creelman (1991). First, in order to determine 
whether parametric or nonparametric signal detection measures should be included in 
data analysis, the distribution o f hit and false alarm rates for the subliminal and 
supraliminal conditions were graphed. As all four distributions were normally 
distributed, parametric measures were appropriate and used in subsequent analyses. Two 
separate 2 (low vs. high anxious) X 2 (subliminal vs. supraliminal) X 2 (threat/neutral vs. 
threat/positive comparisons) Repeated Measures ANOVAs were performed using the 
computer-generated parametric signal detection parameters (d’ and c) for each participant 
as separate dependent variables. The threat/neutral and threat/positive comparison 
independent variable represents the distribution of hit and false alarm rates for target 
stimuli in relation to other stimuli, referred to as distractor stimuli. In the present 
experiment, threatening stimuli are considered ‘targets’ and neutral and positive stimuli, 
considered separately, are referred to as ‘distractors’. Signal detection theory can only 
determine sensitivity and response bias parameters by considering the ability o f 
participants to detect a class o f target stimuli in relation to other stimuli. Nonwords are 
not included in the analyses o f  signal detection data, as there is no meaningful way o f 
classifying nonword stimuli. As such, hit and false alarm rate data cannot be reliably 
computed and without those data, a signal detection analysis cannot be performed. 
Accordingly, all signal detection comparisons include lexical stimuli only.
Sensitivity, indexed by the parameter, d’, was the first dependent variable 
considered and a resultant main effect o f  Presentation Duration, F (1, 71) = 964.42, g <
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.001, was observed. An examination o f condition means revealed that sensitivity was 
significantly higher in the supralim inal condition compared to the subliminal condition 
(M = 2.74, SE = .05; M = .50, SE = .06, respectively). When sensitivity is high, 
individuals are very likely to detect the accurate meaning o f a stimulus and to categorize 
stimuli accurately. Not surprisingly, when stim uli are presented at sufficient duration 
lengths, individuals are better at making categorization decisions. A main effect o f 
Target/Distractor Comparison was also noted, F (1, 71) = 61.16, g < .001. Collapsing 
across presentation duration, an examination o f  group means revealed that overall 
discriminability for threatening target stimuli compared to positive distractors was higher 
than threatening targets compared to neutral distractors (M = 177, SD = .41; M = 1.47,
SD = .41, respectively). Although significant differences were observed among classes o f 
stimuli and between presentation durations, no group differences in sensitivity were noted 
on the primary independent variable o f  interest, anxiety level.
Sensitivity was also computed for the lexical decision task data in order to 
validate the designation o f participants as demonstrating subliminal awareness. If the 
objective measure o f lack o f awareness o f  subliminal stimuli, defined as chance 
performance on the lexical decision task awareness trials, is a reasonable measure o f a 
lack o f conscious awareness o f stimuli, d ’ for lexical decision performance should be 0, 
indicating no ability to discriminate. Therefore, a univariate ANOVA was conducted to 
examine d ’ between participants deemed at chance levels o f performance on the lexical 
decision awareness trials and those deemed to perform at better than chance levels o f
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awareness. Sensitivity (d*) was computed from the overall hit and false alarm rates for 
word/nonword discrimination trials. A “word” response to a word was classified as a 
‘hit’ and a “word” response to a nonword was classified as a  ‘false alarm’. There was a 
significant overall effect, F (1, 97) = 74.10, p  < .001, indicating that, as expected, 
participants demonstrating chance levels o f performance on the LDT task had 
significantly lower estimates o f d’ than individuals who performed at above chance levels 
(M = .04, SD = .30; M = .86, SD = .64, respectively), indicating reduced discriminative 
ability. In order to examine whether the discriminative ability o f  chance participants was 
truly nil, a one-sample t - test was conducted for the average d’ index for this subset of 
individuals (test value = 0). The discriminative ability o f “chance” participants was not 
significantly different from 0, t (72) = 1.11, p  = n.s., however, the ability o f participants 
who were classified at above chance levels of performance in their ability to discriminate 
words from nonwords was significantly higher than 0, t (24) = 6.77, p  < .001. These 
results indicated that according to sensitivity measures, chance participants evidenced no 
ability to discriminate words from nonwords, whereas, participants who were above 
chance levels o f performance evidenced an apparent ability to discriminate words from 
nonwords. These results were compared to overall d’ measures computed for “chance” 
participants for the affective categorization task data in the subliminal presentation 
condition. The overall d’ for threat/neutral words was .46 (.51) and for threat/positive 
words was .54 (.57). Both o f these values were significantly greater than 0, t (72) = 7.62, 
p < .001; t (72) = 8.08, p < .001, respectively. These results indicate that participants
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included in the study were unable to discriminate subliminally presented words from 
nonwords in the lexical decision awareness trials, although they were able to discriminate 
the affective content o f subliminal words in the affective categorization task. Results 
from signal detection analyses further support the demonstration of the subliminal 
processing of the affective content o f information.
The second measure derived from signal detection formulas is c, a  parametric 
index o f  response bias. Significant effects were noted for all independent variables, 
including the group difference variable, anxiety level, on this measure. Results o f  the 2 
(low vs. high anxious) X 2 (subliminal vs. supraliminal) X 2 (threat/neutral vs. 
threat/positive comparisons) Repeated Measures ANOVA indicated a main effect o f 
Target/Distractor comparison, F (1, 71) = 61.16, p  < .001. An examination o f group 
means collapsed across presentation duration revealed that participants demonstrated a 
more conservative response style in the categorization of threatening target stimuli 
compared to positive stimuli than when comparing threatening to neutral stimuli (M =
• 17, SD = .31; M = .02, SD = .30, respectively). These results indicate that participants 
were slightly more conservative in their response style, making fewer false alarms to 
positive stimuli than to neutral stimuli. In this analysis, the response style o f individuals 
to neutral information is not biased in either direction, since c = .02 and is not 
significantly different from c = 0, t (72) = .49, g  = n.s.. A main effect o f Anxiety Level 
was also observed, F (1, 71) = 9.79, j> = .003, indicating that anxious participants 
demonstrated a significantly more liberal overall response bias compared to nonanxious
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participants (M = -.07, SE = .05; M = .19. SE = .05, respectively). However, these results 
need to be qualified  due to two significant interaction effects that were also noted. An 
interaction was found between Presentation Duration and Target/Distractor comparison, F 
(1, 71) = 37.45, p  < .001. Paired comparisons indicated a significant difference between 
the supraliminal and sublim inal presentation durations o f threatening/positive stimuli, t 
(72) = 2.77, p  = .007. The average response bias parameter (c) for supraliminal 
threatening/positive stimuli was .25 (.29) and for the subliminal condition was .09 (.48), 
indicating a more conservative response style with fewer false alarms in the supraliminal 
condition. The overall response bias estimate for the subliminal condition did not 
significantly differ from c = 0 and accordingly, does not reflect a  biased response style, t 
(72) = 1.52, p  = n.s.. A marginal triple-order interaction among Presentation Duration, 
Target/Distractor comparison, and Anxiety Level was also found and qualifies the main 
effect and lower-order interaction previously discussed, F (1,71) = 3.78, p  = .05. A 
univariate strategy was employed to examine the significant overall interaction and 
results are contained in Table 9. A 2 (low vs. high anxious) X 2 (threat/neutral, 
threat/positive comparisons) ANOVA was performed for data in the subliminal 
presentation condition. Results indicated that high and low anxious individuals differed 
in their response pattern to threatening words when considering neutral distractors, F (1, 
72) = 7.11, p  = .009, and positive distractors, F (1, 72) = 5.65, p  = .02. A 2 (low vs. high 
anxious) X 2 (threat/neutral, threat/positive comparisons) ANOVA was performed for 
data from the supraliminal condition. In the supraliminal condition, high and low anxious
72
permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
individuals differed only in their response pattern to threat/positive words, F (1, 72) = 
7.65, g  = .007. Overall, anxious individuals evidenced a more liberal response strategy, 
making a higher proportion o f false alarms for all subliminally presented information. 
When information was presented supraliminally, anxious individuals maintained a 
response style that tended to be more liberal compared to nonanxious individuals. 
Although differences were not quite as robust in the supraliminal condition, the pattern of 
results remained comparable.
Table 9
Average Response Bias (c) bv Presentation Duration. Anxiety Level, and 
Target/Distractor Comparison
Presentation Duration
Subliminal Supraliminal
Low Anxious High Anxious Low Anxious High Anxious
Target/
Distractor
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Threat/
Neutral
.19 .50 -.10* .43 .02 .42 - .05 .32
Threat/
Positive
.22 .49 ..04** .44 .34 .26 .16*** .29
Note. *2  = 009, **p = .02, ***2 = .007
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Decision Time. Decision time refers to the time, measured in milliseconds, that 
it took participants to categorize stimuli in the affective categorization task. Consistent 
with the approach taken in pilot work, responses that were less than 100ms and greater 
than or equal to 3 standard deviations above the average response time were excluded. 
Using this strategy, fewer than 1% o f the total number of responses were excluded. A 2 
(low vs. high anxious) X 2 (subliminal vs. supraliminal) X 3 (threat, neutral, positive 
word type) Repeated Measures ANOVA was conducted. There was a significant main 
effect of Presentation Duration, F (1, 71) = 5.38, p = .02, and Word Type, F (2,142) — 
8.48, p < .001, qualified by a Presentation Duration by Word Type interaction, F (2,142) 
= 9.09, p  < .001. A significant overall triple-order interaction also emerged F (2, 142) = 
3.78, p = .03, however follow-up univariate tests were not significantly different. An 
inspection o f condition means indicates that decision times were significantly longer in 
the subliminal condition compared to the supraliminal condition (M = 1095, SE = 41.91; 
M = 1020, SE = 32.72, respectively). Paired comparisons, including Bonferroni’s 
corrections, were used to examine the Word Type main effect and indicated that positive 
words produced a significantly shorter decision time compared to neutral words and 
nonwords, which did not differ significantly from each other (M  = 1023, SD = 300; M = 
1095, SD = 332; M  = 1089, SD = 411, respectively). Similar comparisons were also used 
to examine the second-order interaction and revealed that decision times were 
significantly longer for positive words in the subliminal condition compared to the 
supraliminal condition (M = 1098, SD = 375; M = 948, SD = 294, respectively).
74
permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Decision times for threatening and neutral words did not significantly differ as a function 
o f presentation duration. Furthermore, there were no significant effects o f  anxiety level 
on decision time.
An exploratory sub-analysis o f  decision time was conducted to examine congruent 
and incongruent decisions to threatening stimuli. A congruent decision was considered a 
“danger” response to a threatening stimulus and an incongruent decision was considered a 
“safe” response to a threatening stimulus. This analysis was undertaken in order to 
determine whether there was an effect o f anxiety for threatening vs. nonthreatening 
categorizations o f threatening stimuli. Threatening stimuli were selected to be examined 
first, as this word category should demonstrate the strongest effects. As the most robust 
differences are expected to emerge in the threatening category, if  no effects o f anxiety 
were apparent for congruent or incongruent decisions to threatening stimuli, then it would 
not appear necessary to pursue further analyses using additional word categories. As 
such, a 2 (low vs. high anxious) X 2 (subliminal vs. supraliminal) X 2 (congruent vs. 
incongruent decision) Repeated Measures ANOVA was performed. A significant main 
effect o f Decision Type emerged, F (1, 56) = 10.51, p  = .002, indicating that all 
participants were relatively faster in making congruent decisions compared to incongruent 
decisions (M = 1040, SE = 33.74; M = 1192, SE = 64.56). In addition, an interaction was 
noted between Presentation Duration and Decision Type, F (1, 56) = 4.12, j> = .047.
Paired comparisons, including appropriate corrections, indicated that individuals 
demonstrated relative speeding for congruent compared to incongruent decisions to
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threatening stimuli in the supraliminal condition (M ~ 1030, SE = 35; M  = 1282, SE = 
102). This sub-analysis demonstrated that individuals were faster for congruent 
decisions, particularly under conditions o f  longer presentation durations. Results o f this 
analysis do not indicate relative speeding in anxious individuals for any decisions 
regarding threatening information.
Task B (Pathfinder Task)
The Pathfinder (Schvaneveldt, 1990) methodology is a computer program that 
generates associative networks based on proximity data or ratings o f similarity. From 
data files containing a matrix o f similarity ratings for all word pairs, a component o f the 
Pathfinder program, PCKNOT (Knowledge Network Organizing Tool for IBM PCs), 
locates the essential links in the network and generates a Pathfinder network (PFnet), 
among other essential functions. The data file resulting from these operations is called a 
“layout file”. A separate layout file for each participant is produced and indicates the 
associative link patterns in the network from which a graphic representation can be 
generated, as well as the total number o f links in the associative network. The Pathfinder 
algorithm uses the parameters o f r = infinity and q = n-1 to generate associative networks. 
The use of r = infinity assumes that the rating data is ordinal in nature, a conservative 
estimate o f the properties o f the ratings. In the equation q = n-1, n represents the number 
of concepts used to generate the ratings. Restricting q to n-1 allows Pathfinder to 
generate the least dense networks. One o f the advantages o f considering Pathfinder 
networks is that they represent the unwieldy information represented by a large number o f
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similarity ratings in a more condensed and easily interpretable format. Although a wealth 
o f information is provided by the Pathfinder program through the use of PCKNOT, much 
o f it is qualitative in nature. Therefore, since I wish to rely on more objective measures 
of association (i.e., number o f  associative links), additional analyses are performed on the 
data represented in the layout files. Information from the layout file regarding concept 
associations and node positioning is computed by a separate computer program that 
generates several other dependent variables. These include the number o f  links within 
specific word categories, between all combinations o f word categories considered two at 
a time, and on individual words.
The dependent variable considered in this analysis is the number o f associative 
links in the network. The number o f links will be considered separately for each type of 
comparison (i.e., total links, within cluster links, and between cluster links). Recall that 
the number of links on a word provides a quantitative measure o f the complexity o f a 
concept or of the relatedness o f specific categories of information considered together. In 
this way, a quantitative index o f knowledge representation between high and low anxious 
individuals can be empirically examined.
The first comparison examines the overall number o f links within the associative 
network for the entire domain o f words under study. A univariate ANOVA was 
performed on data representing the total number of links in participants’ networks using 
anxiety level as the only between-subjects variable. No significant group differences in 
the total number of associative links were found, F ( l ,  71)=  1.66, p  = n.s.
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To explore the number o f  links within the three word categories, a 2 (low vs. high 
anxious) X 3 (threat, neutral, positive word type) Repeated Measures ANOVA using the 
GLM procedure was conducted. There was a significant main effect o f  Word Type, F (2, 
142) = 100.81, p  < .001, although the expected interaction between Word Type and 
Anxiety Level was not found. Paired t-tests revealed that the total sample evidenced 
significantly more links within the positive word category compared to either threatening, 
t (72) 12.27, p  < .001, or neutral words, t (72) = 11.42, p  < .001, which did not 
significantly differ from each other (M =11.11, SD = 3.06; M = 6.26, SD = 2.48; M = 
5.82, SD = 2.49, respectively).
The number o f links between word categories was also examined to investigate 
whether high and low anxious individuals evidenced more complex networks for a subset 
of the domain o f information employed in this experiment. A 2 (low vs. high anxiety) X 
3 (threat-positive, threat-neutral, neutral-positive between word type comparison) 
Repeated Measures ANOVA using the GLM procedure was conducted. A main effect of 
Between Category comparison was found, F (2, 142) = 51.73, p < .001, although, again, 
no effect o f anxiety on the dependent variable was observed. Paired comparisons 
revealed that participants had a greater number o f links between the threatening and 
positive word categories compared to the number o f links between either threatening 
words and neutral words, t (72) = -8.23, p < .001, or positive words and neutral words, t 
(72) = -7.90, p  < .001 (M = 6.51, SD = 5.36; M = 164. SD =  1.75; M = 1-70, SD = 3.98, 
respectively).
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Discussion
The overall aims o f the present research project were fulfilled. Specifically, the 
literature base exam ining cognition and emotion was broadened and several interesting 
results merit further discussion. Refinements to the affective categorization task 
methodology based on the pilot data were beneficial and help to clarify the current picture 
regarding the underlying mechanisms responsible for the production o f  threat-related 
processing biases. In general, the results of the full study replicate and extend the 
findings obtained in pilot work. I will begin the present discussion by interpreting the 
significance o f relevant results and evaluating how the findings obtained matched a priori 
assumptions, as well as relevant theories of information processing.
Before I can undertake a discussion of the data relevant to the experimental 
hypotheses, I must be certain that the stimuli I am referring to as subliminal are in fact 
subliminal. To examine the ability of participants in this study to consciously perceive 
briefly presented visual stimuli, objective awareness o f subliminally presented stimuli 
must be measured. The findings were consistent with participants demonstrating an 
overall lack o f awareness o f subliminal stimuli, as evidenced by lexical decision accuracy 
that was no greater than chance levels o f discrimination and measures o f sensitivity that 
were nil. These measures indicate that participants had virtually no ability to discriminate 
between subliminally presented words and nonwords.
Recall that in pilot work, a greater than expected number o f participants 
demonstrated above chance levels o f discrimination. Consequently, methodological
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changes in the presentation and selection o f  stimuli were proposed in the full study to 
address this issue. In the affective categorization task, stimuli were presented either 
sublim inally  or supraliminally, but not in both conditions. Additionally, a novel subset o f 
stimuli were selected for inclusion in the lexical decision trials. These methodological 
changes appeared to be generally successful in reducing objective awareness of 
subliminal stimuli. Although average classification rates in the lexical decision task were 
reduced significantly after making this change (from 67% to 55%), the overall lexical 
decision classification rate remained statistically greater than chance. This was the case 
even though stimuli were presented for only 14 ms followed by a backward pattern mask 
designed to preclude stimulus processing. This finding is particularly meaningful as it 
points to the importance o f evaluating the ability o f participants to perceive seemingly 
“subliminal” stimuli. Therefore, when using standard presentation times for subliminal 
stimuli, it is imperative that the ability o f participants to detect stimuli be accurately 
measured and not simply assumed. One methodological alternative that could be 
employed in future research is to tailor presentation times to individualized thresholds, 
whereby, each participant demonstrates a lack of objective awareness o f subliminal 
material. Doing so could result in less wasted effort in running participants through the 
entire experimental protocol and then having to discard their data when they do not meet 
lexical awareness criteria.
As participants appeared unable to consciously perceive subliminally presented 
information, an evaluation o f the first experimental hypothesis may proceed. I predicted
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that information in the affective categorization task would be processed subliminally. As 
in the pilot study, subliminal processing was illustrated by the observation that 
participants were able to classify lexical subliminal stimuli with a greater than 60% 
accuracy. Sensitivity measures were also computed on the affective categorization task 
data and indicated that participants evidenced some ability to discriminate subliminal 
stimuli. This same subset of participants was no better than chance at classifying 
subliminally presented words and nonwords, demonstrating an apparent lack of 
awareness o f the semantic content of subliminal information. Despite participants’ 
inability to classify subliminally presented words and nonwords at any better than chance 
levels, individuals were able to decipher at least some o f the basic features o f stimuli in 
the affective categorization task. That is, in the affective categorization task participants 
were able to accurately classify subliminal stimuli at greater than chance levels. How 
should this finding be interpreted?
Other researchers (Marcel, 1983) have demonstrated that when visual stimuli are 
degraded to the point at which they are no longer consciously perceived, the ability to 
make complex semantic judgments persist. In the area of emotional information 
processing, it has been observed that individuals consistently make preference judgments 
for stimuli without an apparent ability to report the basis upon which those judgments are 
made (Zajonc, 1980). Additionally, early work in the area o f emotion and word 
recognition, although methodologically questionable, focused attention on the apparently 
persistent influence o f emotion on perception. That work examining a phenomenon
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referred to as perceptual defense, in which “taboo” words were shown to have higher 
recognition thresholds than neutral or positively valenced information (see Niedenthai,
1992, for a review), generated theories aimed at describing how “the emotionality o f the 
input may affect the perception o f the input” (Erdelyi, 1974, p. 14). Later work has 
demonstrated disruptive effects o f negative emotional information on performance (see 
Williams, et al., 1997, for a cogent review). As such, it may be that affective information 
may exert a primacy effect on some cognitive processes. In fact, Dixon (1981) asserts 
that '‘the emotional connotations of an external stimulus may be reacted to before or 
without achieving conscious representation, and this emotional ‘classification, then 
determines subsequent events” (p. 121). Therefore, consistent with prior research in the 
area o f subliminal processing, I was able to demonstrate the influence o f emotion on pre- 
conscious processing o f information. However, this effect is simply a necessary 
prerequisite to the more specific goal o f investigating the effects o f a discrete mood state, 
anxiety, on information processing. I will reserve further commentary on the more 
general effects o f emotional meaning on subliminal processing until I describe the overall 
findings in greater detail.
The second and third experimental hypotheses address the accurate categorization 
o f classes o f stimuli and therefore are closely related. It was predicted that anxious 
individuals would evidence an enhanced ability to correctly classify subliminally 
presented threatening stimuli, whereas, nonanxious individuals would demonstrate an 
enhanced ability to correctly categorize subliminally presented neutral and positive
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information. Nonwords were not expected to discriminate between individuals who 
differed in anxiety. In general, this is what was found. When considering hit and false 
alarm rates, anxious individuals demonstrate a higher hit rate for subliminal threatening 
information. However, anxious individuals also evidence a significantly higher false 
alarm rate to neutral and positive words. A nonsignificant trend was also observed in that 
anxious individuals categorize nonwords as dangerous more often than nonanxious 
participants. Nonanxious individuals make fewer false alarms to neutral and positive 
stimuli and therefore, are seemingly better at classifying these types o f  information. Such 
a finding is consistent with other work demonstrating a positivity bias in normals 
(Constans, et al., 1999; MacLeod, et al., 1986; Taylor & Hope, 1989). That work has 
demonstrated that nonpathologically anxious individuals appear to have a tendency to 
divert attentional resources to information that is nonthreatening. Because of an 
enhanced tendency to focus on nonthreatening information, nonanxious individuals may 
be better able to accurately classify information that is positive in valence. In some ways, 
these data could be viewed from an expertise model. Anxious and nonanxious 
individuals, through biological mechanisms or prior learning history, may be better able 
to classify information that they are more familiar with or that is more relevant to them.
It was demonstrated that at a pre-conscious level, individuals are able to process 
information to such an extent that differences in affective categorizations can be reliably 
tied to varying levels o f trait anxiety.
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However, rather than speculate on the implications o f the relationship between 
raw hit and false alarm rates observed in the affective categorization task data, I have 
chosen to employ the methodology o f signal detection theory to evaluate the independent 
contributions o f both accurate and inaccurate classifications o f target stimuli. Signal 
detection theory is an approach which takes into account standardized hit and false alarm 
rates so that an index o f  one’s ability to discriminate among classes o f  stimuli and a 
measure o f  an individual’s tendency to respond in a particular manner is obtained. By 
examining the data in this way, I am able to ascertain whether individuals are able to 
more accurately categorize certain classes o f stimuli due to an enhanced ability to detect 
and process a stimulus’ meaning or whether such a difference arises from a tendency to 
consistently select one response in favor o f another, independent o f  stimulus content.
Analyses using signal detection theory further clarify the hit and false alarm rate 
data. Recall that anxious participants evidence a greater proportion o f danger responses 
to subliminally presented threatening stimuli which translates into enhanced hit rates for 
threatening information. However, anxious participants also were observed to classify 
subliminally presented neutral and positive information as dangerous more often, leading 
to greater false alarm rates. In contrast, nonanxious participants evidence a lower hit rate 
for threatening information and enhanced hit rates for subliminally presented neutral and 
positive information. The increased ability o f anxious individuals to classify threatening 
stimuli and nonanxious individuals to classify neutral or positive stimuli does not appear 
to be due to an enhanced ability to discern the lexical or affective qualities o f subliminally
84
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
presented content-specific information. In fact, it appears that highly trait anxious 
individuals are predisposed to respond to subliminally presented lexical information, 
regardless o f affective valence, with a threatening interpretation. In other words, anxious 
individuals make significantly more false alarms to subliminally presented information 
that is neutral or positive in valence than nonanxious individuals. Such a response pattern 
translates into a response bias for anxious individuals when considering subliminal 
lexical information. A similar, although less consistent response pattern is apparent for 
supraliminal information. Interestingly, there was no significant difference between 
anxious and nonanxious individuals for the threatening/nonword comparison, although 
results tended in that direction. Therefore, it seems that the observed response bias in 
anxious individuals is more robust for lexical stimuli compared to nonlexical stimuli.
However, it seems that the increased ability o f anxious and nonanxious 
individuals to categorize threatening and nonthreatening material is accounted for by a 
trade-off in the rate o f false alarms to such stimuli. In other words, anxious individuals 
are less accurate in categorizing briefly presented nonthreatening lexical stimuli because 
they are more likely to categorize such information as “dangerous”. Nonanxious 
individuals are less likely to categorize all subliminally presented lexical information, 
including threatening stimuli, as dangerous, so they are less accurate when attempting to 
categorize threat information. According to Ohman’s (1993) model o f fear and anxiety, a 
perceptual system, that has evolved to effectively locate threat in one’s environment, is 
more adaptive and successful when there is a liberal perceptual threshold in which false
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alarms are maximized. Thereby, processing mechanisms that identify threatening stimuli 
on the basis of relatively simple features and are biased in the interpretation o f threat are 
essential. In fact, the data point to such mechanisms at work in the categorization o f  
subliminally  presented verbal stimuli in anxious individuals. Such effects appear to 
operate more strongly at pre-attentive levels, as evidenced by the lack o f consistent 
differences demonstrated under conditions o f  conscious processing. This is consistent 
with the theoretical models proposed by Williams and colleagues (1988; 1997) and 
Ohman (1993). Pre-attentive mechanisms appear to function largely to classify stimuli as 
threatening or not (Mathews, 1988). Anxious individuals appear to have a predisposition 
to classify briefly presented information as threatening. However, under conditions in 
which processing is allowed to proceed consciously, there is a  reduced tendency to 
respond with a threatening interpretation.
Although prior data (see Williams, et al., 1997) and theoretical speculation 
suggest that anxious individuals may possess an enhanced ability to select threatening 
information from the environment, this was not observed in the current study. Increased 
discrimination o f threatening content may, in fact, be apparent in anxious individuals, 
despite the lack o f  ability to demonstrate it using the current methodology. According to 
Mathews (1988), the consistent demonstration o f a processing priority for threatening 
information in anxious individuals is observed in situations in which there is a 
competition for cognitive resources. The design o f the present study employed a single 
stimulus presentation and was not an attempt to examine a resource competition
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hypothesis. As such, the categorization o f single stimuli may not be a methodological 
paradigm which is sensitive to differences in stimulus discriminability. A modification to 
the current methodology that would address this particular hypothesis could include a 
dual stimulus display. It could also be argued that enhanced sensitivity for threat in 
anxious individuals may be a function of more basic perceptual processes, like perception 
and initial encoding o f stimuli. Response bias processes may be more influential at later 
stages o f  information processing when an actual response is selected. The categorization 
o f words based on semantic meaning is believed to occur at later stages o f processing, 
drawing on input from information gathered during initial registration and encoding. 
Therefore, the affective categorization task may simply be a more accurate way o f 
exam ining processing biases influencing response selection at later stages o f information 
processing.
Notwithstanding, the presence o f either enhanced discriminability for threatening 
information in the environment or a biased tendency to perceive and interpret information 
as threatening or both could account for the empirical findings o f threat-related 
information processing biases in anxiety. Further investigations o f  these mechanisms and 
the conditions under which they are apparent could offer insight into the etiology and 
maintenance o f the disordered cognitions which characterize anxious individuals.
To further elucidate the mechanisms involved in processing differences between 
anxious and nonanxious individuals, decision times for affective categorizations were 
examined. I expected, based on pilot work, that anxious individuals would evidence
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slowing for affective categorization decisions. However, in the complete study no group 
differences on this dependent variable emerged. A potential explanation for the 
incongruence in findings regarding decision time between the pilot study and the actual 
study could be that the anxious group in the pilot study was made up o f only two 
individuals, one o f whom was significantly older than the remainder o f the sample. 
Reaction time experiments have demonstrated that the age o f  participants correlates 
positively with reaction time (J. Constans, personal communication, June, 1999). 
Therefore, age effects cannot be ruled out as a potential confound responsible for the 
lengthened decision times observed in the pilot data. However, this alternative 
explanation must be considered purely speculative given the small number of individuals 
in the high anxious group. Hence, the age confound in the pilot study cannot be ruled out 
as a plausible interpretation o f the data, however, it also cannot be accepted 
unequivocably.
The alternative prediction related to decision time proposes that decision times 
should be faster to material that matches the mood of the perceiver. The theoretical basis 
for response speeding is based on a network model which asserts that as a result of 
priming and the spreading o f activation, individuals who are in a specific mood state 
should attend to and recall information compatible with their current mood state. I found 
no evidence for speeding o f affective decisions as a function o f mood state, consistent 
with other work examining decision times for lexical or affective decisions (Hill & 
Kemp-Wheeler, 1989; MacLeod & Mathews, 1991; Mathews, 1990; Mathews & Milroy,
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1994). It could be argued that the lack o f  a significant effect could be due to a failure to 
manipulate current mood. This appears to be an unlikely explanation for the null results 
observed, since estimates o f current mood were obtained in this study. Highly trait 
anxious participants reported significantly greater current negative mood states as 
measured by the STAI. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that generally anxious 
participants were also more anxious at the time o f testing than nonanxious participants.
As such, the mood congruity hypothesis does not appear to be borne out by the present 
data. A plausible reason for the lack o f  findings for decision time speeding could be 
related to Mathews and MacLeod’s (1994) assertion that there may, in fact, be no overall 
increase in speed or efficiency in the processing o f  threatening information by anxious 
individuals. Alternatively, they propose that threatening information is only preferentially 
encoded when other information is presented in the same context. Another potential 
explanation for the present failure to find mood congruent speeding in anxious 
individuals may be found in an analysis of network data.
No differences between anxious and nonanxious individuals were demonstrated 
when exam ining  network complexity for the domain o f information considered in this 
study. Mood-congruent memory effects are founded on the supposition that there are 
differences in network representations for information which is congruent with the mood 
o f the perceiver. In this study, using generally anxious and nonanxious college students, 
there were no demonstrable differences in the stimuli selected to represent network 
knowledge organization for threatening and nonthreatening types o f  information. If  there
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truly are no differences in the long-term storage o f information between these two types 
o f individuals, then I would not expect, at least under conditions that allow strategic 
elaboration, differences in the speed with which individuals respond to material that is the 
focus o f their concern. Therefore, the lack of differences found with regard to network 
complexity is consistent with the dearth o f findings with regard to decision time.
However, it would be premature, based on one attempt to demonstrate network 
knowledge differences, to conclude that there are no differences between anxious and 
nonanxious individuals in knowledge organization for threatening and nonthreatening 
information. It is possible that I failed to demonstrate differences in network organization 
due to an unrepresentative sample o f the domain o f stimuli used in the present study. It is 
possible, although unlikely, that there is some inherent factor o f the subset o f  stimuli 
selected for inclusion in the network generation task that precluded finding significant 
differences between the individuals in this study. That seems to be an implausible 
explanation for the current results due to the careful attention that was paid to the 
selection o f stimuli for the overall experiment and the random manner in which a subset 
of stimuli was drawn for inclusion in the network generation task.
One potential modification to the current methodology that might aid in the 
clarification o f network differences between anxious and nonanxious individuals, 
assuming they do in fact exist, would be the inclusion o f labels related to evaluative 
dimensions tapping “danger” (e.g., risky, dangerous, threatening) and “safe” (e.g., safe, 
harmless, innocuous) dimensions. Since no evaluative component was included in the
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present study, I was only able to evaluate the semantic structure of specific domains o f 
information and were unable to examine the relationship between specific classes of 
information and threatening and nonthreatening evaluations. It is possible that the 
organization o f information between anxious and nonanxious individuals does not differ 
for specific classes o f information, but would differ for associative representations 
between negative and positive evaluative concepts and affectively congruent information.
Another potential explanation for the lack o f significant findings for network 
differences could be that the level at which a bias is observed in the processing o f 
threatening information does not arise from structures which represent the long-term 
storage o f information. Processing biases associated with anxious mood states have been 
interpreted to result from mechanisms operating at much earlier stages o f information 
processing, such as perceptual and attentional processes. In fact, the data suggest that 
anxiety-related processing biases in affective categorizations operate more strongly at 
earlier pre-conscious levels o f awareness. Theoretically, some alternatives to network 
theory, specifically, the models offered by Williams and colleagues (1997) and Ohman 
(1993), posit the origin of threat-related biases in anxiety as resulting from mechanisms 
that are influenced by, but not necessarily directly related to long-term knowledge 
organization. Data from the current research is consistent with those models and point to 
a clear tendency for anxious individuals to label all information that is barely perceptible 
as threatening. It does not support an interpretation that describes anxious individuals as 
being any better than nonanxious individuals in detecting threat in their environment due
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to differences in internal semantic representations o f threatening information in memory. 
The existence o f such a bias in anxious individuals has multiple significant implications. 
Under conditions in which information is encountered briefly and there is no opportunity 
for more extensive evaluation to clarify what was perceived, a tendency for anxious 
individuals to perceive a threatening meaning in innocuous stimuli could lead to 
enhanced encoding o f threat to the exclusion o f  alternative interpretations. In other 
words, under such conditions, anxious individuals would encode a threatening meaning to 
stimuli and therefore have a biased source o f information with which to guide future 
behavior. Biased encoding of information could even lead to the development or 
maintenance o f cognitive distortions (e.g., mislabeling, fortune-teller error) and 
dysfunctional schemata (e.g., “The world is a dangerous place.”) that are purported to be 
involved in the maintenance of pathological anxiety (Beck, 1976). If  cognitive resources 
are preferentially allocated to the processing o f information labeled as threatening, 
regardless o f the content o f information, processing resources are squandered needlessly. 
As such, fewer resources are available for other tasks and performance decrements can 
result. Additionally, a tendency in anxious individuals to cognitively label harmless 
information as threatening, could lead to increased autonomic arousal and serve to 
maintain a heightened physical response that is both distressing to the individual and 
maladaptive in the long term. Therefore, a response style biased in the direction o f threat 
may serve to color the basic perception of information and, in combination with other
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processing biases, result in a distorted view o f stimuli in the environment and subsequent 
impairments in the ability to discriminate the true content o f  affective information.
Future researchers may wish to include individuals with clinical levels o f anxiety 
since it may be the case that there are basic differences in the associative representation o f 
knowledge for anxious and nonanxious individuals, but that such differences do not exist 
at nonpathological levels o f  anxiety. Perhaps, knowledge representation differences may 
emerge only at the most extreme levels of anxiety for information that is more relevant to 
the feared object. General levels o f anxiety and verbal stimuli that are relatively familiar 
in one’s environment may be too nonspecific and not emotionally relevant enough to 
evoke changes in the structural knowledge representations o f long-term memory. The 
evaluation o f highly anxiety-provoking stimuli in a clinical population may offer 
additional insight into the mechanisms underlying threat-related biases.
In summary, the overall aims o f  the proposed study were accomplished. I was 
able to demonstrate that the affective quality of a stimulus influences some aspects of 
affective categorization decisions. The influence o f emotion on affective decisions was 
most strongly apparent under conditions of subliminal processing. A similar, although 
less robust pattern o f findings, was observed under conditions o f elaborative processing 
and indicate the possibility that different mechanisms are involved in the processing o f 
information under automatic and strategic levels o f cognition. I was also able to 
demonstrate an apparent response bias evident in generally anxious individuals, whereby, 
they have a tendency to categorize all information, although particularly subliminal
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information, as threatening. No differences were observed between anxious and 
nonanxious individuals under conditions o f either subliminal or supraliminal processing 
in sensitivity, or the ability to detect the accurate meaning o f stimuli. Affective 
categorization differences were not reliably related to decision speed or network 
complexity. Results obtained in the present study further indicate the necessity o f 
expanding the scope o f  information processing biases in anxiety beyond a simplistic 
network account.
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Appendix A 
Social Anxiety and Distress Scale (SAD) 
(Watson & Friend, 1969)
1. T F I feel relaxed even in unfamiliar social situations.
2. T F I try to avoid situations which force me to be very sociable.
3. T F It is easy for me to relax when I am with strangers.
4. T F 1 have no particular desire to avoid people.
5. T F I often find social occasions upsetting.
6. T F I usually feel calm and comfortable at social occasions.
7. T F I am usually at ease when talking to someone o f  the opposite sex.
8. T F I try to avoid talking to people unless I know them well.
9. T F If the chance comes to meet new people, I usually take it.
10. T F I often feel nervous or tense in casual get-togethers in which both 
sexes are present.
11. T F I am usually nervous with people unless I know them well.
12. T F I usually feel relaxed when I am with a group o f people.
13. T F I often want to get away from people.
14. T F I usually feel uncomfortable when I am in a group o f people I 
don’t know.
15. T F I usually feel relaxed when I meet someone for the first time.
16. T F Being introduced to people makes me tense and nervous.
17. T F Even though a room is fall o f strangers, I may enter it anyway.
18. T F I would avoid walking up and joining a large group o f  people.
19. T F When my superiors want to talk to me, I talk willingly.
20. T F I often feel on edge when I am with a group o f people.
21. T F I tend to withdraw from people.
22. T F I don’t mind talking to people at parties or social gatherings.
23. T F I am seldom at ease in a large group o f people.
24. T F I often think up excuses in order to avoid social engagements.
25. T F I sometimes take the responsibility for introducing people to each 
other.
26. T F I try to avoid formal social occasions.
27. T F 1 usually go to whatever social engagement I have.
28. T F I find it easy to relax with other people.
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Appendix B
Pilot Words and Category Assignment
THREAT NEUTRAL
Social Nonsocial Social Nonsocial
criticism accident approach armoire
disgrace agony chat bathtub
embarrassment ambulance conversation bedroom
failure assault encounter blanket
fool beating gathering blender
gossip coffin group bookend
hatred corpse host cabinet
humiliation crutches interaction canister
idiot disability meeting cookbook
inadequacy disease mingling dishwasher
incompetence emergency negotiation dresser
inferiority fatality others faucet
insult illness participation fireplace
loneliness infection party lawnmower
loser injury people linoleum
misfit mutilation presentation magazine
outcast paralysis reception screwdriver
rejection sickness society sponge
scom stabbing speech staircase
stupidity violence talking wallpaper
POSITIVE
Social Nonsocial
acceptance popularity bliss pleasure
admiration praise contentment prize
adoration respect delight satisfaction
applause success enjoyment serenity
approval talent euphoria virtue
assurance honor excellence miracle
attraction love excitement peace
charisma faith
charm goodness
compliment greatness
confidence happiness
friendship hope
glory joy
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Appendix C
Social Neutral Category Generation Instructions
I am entreating your help in generating a subset o f words for use in my dissertation. I 
would like to develop a list of social words that are neutral in emotional valence. For 
example, clearly socially threatening (negative) words would be embarrassment, 
humiliation, etc. Positive (non-threatening) social words would be exemplified by words 
like poised, attractive, etc. I would like to compose a list o f social words that may be 
either threatening or non-threatening, but are not clearly one or the other. For example, 
words that I have thought o f so far are date, party, conversation, group, etc. In the space 
below, please write down as many words as you can think o f  that may fit this general 
category and return to my mailbox ASAP.
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Appendix D
Social/Non-Social Word Categorization Task
The following list contains a number o f different types o f words. Please place the words 
into 1 o f 2 categories: SOCIAL or NON-SOCIAL. A social word is a  word that 
specifically relates to social interactions between people and or evaluation by others (e.g., 
dance, hate). Words that are not specifically related to social interactions would be 
considered non-social. Such words could represent simple objects, events or feelings 
related to physical health and well-being, and/or positive feelings or personality traits. If 
you are unsure about how to categorize a word, please make the best choice. Choose only
one category and do not leave any blank.
SOCIAL =  1 
NON-SOCIAL = 2
paper _
shelf _
euphoria _
applause
scom
dancing
window
paralysis
goodness
presentation
dresser
confidence
collapse
assault
faucet
gab
honor
misfit
cancer
contentment
social
kitchen
excitement
worthlessness
garage
favorite
adulation
television
talking __
conversation __
failure __
fatality __
chimney __
foolishness _
disgrace _
mingling _
look _
canister _
agony _
happiness _
furniture __
comfort _
blanket _
blood _
serenity _
relaxation _
chat _
ineptness _
date 
love
company
society
excellence
success
gratitude
admonishment
greatness _
gutter _
stupidity _
party _
approval _
hearse _
calendar _
speech _
qualification _
talent
optimism
telephone
embarrassment
interaction
encounter
bookend
acceptance
attraction
amusement
tumor
indecision
introduction
boldness
flaw
emergency
disease
peace
fun
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Appendix E
Familiarity Rating Task
Please rate how familiar you are with the following words using the scale below. On this 
scale, smaller numbers represent a lack o f familiarity (seldom using, thinking of, seeing, 
or hearing a word) while larger numbers represent a high degree o f familiarity (frequently 
using, seeing, thinking of, or hearing a word). Place the appropriate number (1-7) in the
blank.
'   1 1
6 7
Extremely familiar
-I-
■
1 2 
Not at all familiar
4 5
Moderately familiar
paper _
shelf _
euphoria _
applause _
scom _
dancing
window
paralysis
goodness
presentation _
dresser
confidence
collapse
assault
faucet
gab
honor
misfit
cancer
contentment
social
kitchen
excitement
worthlessness
garage
favorite
adulation
television
luxury
carpet
talking __
conversation __
failure __
fatality __
chimney __
foolishness _
disgrace _
mingling _
look _
canister _
agony _
happiness _
furniture _
comfort _
blanket _
blood _
serenity _
relaxation _
chat _
ineptness _
date 
love
company
society
excellence
success
gratitude
admonishment
host
others
greatness _
gutter _
stupidity _
party _
approval _
hearse _
calendar _
speech _
qualification _
talent
optimism
telephone
embarrassment
interaction
encounter
bookend
acceptance
attraction
amusement
tumor
indecision
introduction
boldness
flaw
emergency
disease
peace
fun
assurance
group
105
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Appendix F
Emotionality Rating Task
Please rate the following words for emotionality. Emotionality is defined as the ability of 
the word to produce a strong subjective response or feeling that can be either positive or 
negative. Use the following numeric scale when making word ratings. Place the 
appropriate whole number (1-7) in the blank next to each word. If  you are unsure o f  the
meaning of a word, leave it blank.
-I-
1 2 
Very strong 
negative emotion
paper
shelf
euphoria _
applause _
scom __
dancing
window
paralysis
goodness
presentation
dresser
confidence
collapse
assault
faucet
gab
honor
misfit
cancer
contentment
social
kitchen
excitement
worthlessness
garage
favorite
adulation
television
4 5
Neither positive 
or negative
talking
conversation
failure
fatality
chimney
foolishness
disgrace
mingling
look
canister
agony _
happiness _
furniture _
comfort _
blanket _
blood _
serenity _
relaxation _
chat _
ineptness _
date 
love
company
society
excellence
success
gratitude
admonishment
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6 7
Very strong 
positive emotion
greatness _
gutter _
stupidity _
party _
approval _
hearse _
calendar _
speech _
qualification _ 
talent _
optimism _
telephone 
embarrassment^ 
interaction 
encounter 
bookend 
acceptance 
attraction 
amusement 
tumor 
indecision 
introduction 
boldness 
flaw
emergency
disease
peace
fun
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Appendix G
General Experimental Instructions
“In the first set o f trials you will be asked to make “safe” and “danger” judgments to 
neutral and emotional words. Some o f these words will be presented very rapidly. A safe 
word is a word that is non-threatening and a danger word is a word that is threatening. If  
you are unsure, then make a guess. If you have no questions, please read and follow the 
instructions on the computer screen.”
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Appendix H
Computer Task Instructions
Overall Instructions
“This experiment involves making judgments about words that are presented at various 
speeds. Some o f the words that you will see in this experiment will be presented very 
rapidly. Please pay attention to all o f the words and try to make the best judgment you 
can. If  you are uncertain about what you saw, then guess.
At the beginning o f  each trial, a + sign will be presented in the center o f the computer 
screen. After the offset o f  this + sign, a word will appear. Your job is to press the ‘z’
(‘/ ’) key if  the word means ‘danger’ and to press the 7 ’ (‘z ’) key if  the word means ‘safe’.
In the second part o f  the experiment, the + sign will either be replaced by a meaningful 
word or a non-word. Your job in this part is to press the ‘z ’ ( ‘/ ’) key if  a non-word was 
presented and to press the 7 ’ ( ‘z’) key if  a meaningful word was presented.
There will always be several practice trials before each set o f experimental trials. Press 
the space-bar to view the instructions for the first set o f trials.”
Instructions for affective categorization task
“These are the instructions for the first set o f trials. In all o f  these trials you will first see 
a + sign. Immediately following the + sign, a word will appear, perhaps very briefly.
Your job is to press the ‘z’ (‘/’) key if the word presented means ‘danger’ and to press the 
7 ’ (‘z’) key if  the word means ‘safe’. This task is completely subjective and you should 
make the judgment that seems best as quickly as possible.
First, there will be a series of practice trials in which you will receive feedback about your 
performance. Once the experimental trials begin, you will no longer receive any feedback 
about your performance.
Please place your left index finger on the ‘z’ key and place your right index finger on the 
7 ’ key.
Press either key when you are ready to start the practice trials.”
Instructions for awareness check
“These are the instructions for the next set of trials. Again, in all o f these trials, you will 
first see a + sign. Immediately following the + sign, either a word or a non-word will be
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presented, followed by asterisks (******). In half (50%) o f the trials a word (candle) will 
be presented and in half (50%) o f the trials a non-word (dnelca) will be presented.
In these trials, your job is to press the ‘z’ ( 7 ’) key if a non-word was presented 
immediately before the asterisks (*****♦) and to press the 7 ’ ( ‘z’) key if  a word was 
presented immediately before the asterisks (******).
First, there will be a series o f practice trials in which you will receive feedback about your 
performance. Once the experimental trials begin, you will no longer receive any feedback 
about your performance.
Please place your left index finger on the ‘z’ key and place your right index finger on the 
7 ’ key.
Press either key when you are ready to start the practice trials.”
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Appendix I 
Participant Debriefing
You have just participated in a study that is part o f a more extensive research project 
designed to investigate how different types o f people think about and evaluate positive 
and negative social information. We are trying to determine if  socially anxious people 
think about and make judgments o f emotional words differently from people who are not 
socially anxious. If you have any additional questions, please ask the experimenter now 
or you can contact the graduate student responsible for the project at (504) 568-0811 
x5389. Thank you for your participation.
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Appendix J
Affective Categorization Task Words
THREAT NEUTRAL POSITIVE NONWOH
accident; stupidity armoire; wallpaper acceptance; talent emudeawr
ambulance; violence bathtub; window admiration; virtue ajapsam
assault bedroom adoration ntakopt
bandage blanket amusement wimiutss
beating blender applause itubdoys
blood bookend approval ecknackle
cancer burner assurance oxerbs
coffin cabinet beauty eawster
corpse calendar bliss caktej
criticism canister charisma ilsperps
death carpet charm ttuonb
disability chimney compliment yegealses
disease computer contentment aglosesh
disgrace cookbook delight unsassgles
embarrassment cup eloquence asllvero
emergency dish enthusiasm ayntospeh
failure dishwasher exuberance suotrers
harm dresser faith tabrete
hatred faucet flattery tghignown
hazard fireplace generosity sohtrs
hospital furniture glory
humiliation garage goodness
idiot gutter gratitude
ignorance kitchen greatness
illness lawnmower heaven
indecision magazine hero
injury mailbox joy
insult microwave justice
judgment plate laughter
kill plug love
loneliness refrigerator miracle
loser screwdriver optimism
mistake shelf peace
mutilation sponge pleasure
paralysis staircase praise
rejection telephone prize
sickness television satisfaction
stabbing tongs serenity
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Appendix K.
Pathfinder Task Words
THREAT NEUTRAL
cancer cabinet
accident faucet
death carpet
rejection microwave
humiliation armoire
loser dishwasher
POSITIVE
pleasure
goodness
heaven
acceptance
praise
love
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